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CHAPTER 10 
Constitutional Law 
BERNARD ORTWEIN* 
§ 10.1 Obscenity Statute: Constitutionality: Construction. In 
1974 Massachusetts amended its obscenity statutes' in an attempt to 
• Bernard Ortwein is an associate professor of law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§10.1. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 430, G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-31 provide in pertinent part: 
§ 28C: 
Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a book which is being dissemi-
nated, or is in the possession of any person who intends to disseminate the same, 
is obscene, the attorney general, or any district attorney within his district, shall 
bring an information or petition in equity in the superior court directed against said 
book by name. Upon the filing of such information or petition in equity, a justice 
of the superior court shall, if, upon a summary examination of the book, he is of 
opinion that there is reasonable cause to believe that such book is obscene, issue 
an order of notice, returnable in or within thirty days, directed against such book 
by name and addressed to all persons interested in the dissemination thereof, to 
show cause why said book should not be judicially determined to be obscene. 
[Notice provisions omitted.] ... After the issuance of an order of notice under 
the provisions of this section, the court shall, on motion of the attorney general or 
district attorney, make an interlocutory finding and adjudication that said book is 
obscene, which finding and adjudication shall be of the same force and effect as 
the final finding and adjudication provided in section twenty-eight E or section 
twenty-eight F, but only until such final finding and adjudication is made or until 
further order of the court. It shall be an affirmative defense under this section if 
the evidence proves that the defendant was a bona fide school, museum or library, 
or was acting in the course of his employment as an employee of such organization 
or of a retail outlet affiliated with and serving the educational purpose of such 
organization. 
§ 280: 
Any person interested in the dissemination of said book may appear and file an 
answer on or before the return day named in said notice or within such further time 
as the court may allow, and may claim a right to trial by jury on the issue whether 
said book is obscene. 
§ 28E: 
If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may . 
order a general default and if the court finds that the book is obscene, may make 
an adjudication against the book that the same is obscene. 
1
Ortwein: Chapter 10: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
178 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OP MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §10.1 
conform to the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme 
I28F: 
If an appearance is entered and answer filed, the case shall be set down for speedy 
hearing, but a default and order shall first be entered against all persons who have 
not appeared and answered. . . . Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance 
with the usual course of proceedings in equity including all rights of exception and 
appeal. At such hearing the court may receive the testimony of experts and may 
receive evidence aa to the literary, artistic, political or scientific character of said 
book and aa to the manner and form of its dissemination. Upon such hearing, the 
court may make an adjudication in the manner provided in said section twenty-
eight E. 
I28H: 
In any trial under section twenty-nine on an indictment found or a complaint 
made for any offence committed after the filing of a proceeding under section 
twenty-eight C, the fact of such filing and the action of the court or jury thereon, if 
any, shall be admissible in evidence. If prior to the said offense a fmal decree had 
been entered against the book, the defendant, if the book be obscene, shall be 
conclusively presumed to have known aaid book to be obscene, or if aaid decree had 
been in favor of the book he shall be conclusively presumed not to have known said 
book to the obscene, or if no final decree had been entered but a proceeding had 
been filed prior to aaid offence, the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to 
have had knowledge of the contents of aaid book. 
§29: 
Whoever disseminates any matter which is obscene, knowing it to be obscene, or 
whoever haa in his poaseaaion any matter which is obscene, knowing it to be ob-
scene, with the intent-to disseminate the same, shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for not more than five years or in a jail or house of correction for 
not more than two and one half years, or by a fine of not leaa than one hundred 
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by both such fme and imprisonment 
in a jail or house of correction. It shall be an affirmative defense under this section 
if the evidence proves that the defendant waa a bona fide school, museum or library, 
or waa acting in the course of his employment aa an employee of such organization 
or of a retail outlet affiliated with and serving the educational purpose of such 
organization. 
§30: 
The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enjoin the dissemination of any 
matter which is obscene. The attomey general or a district attomey within his 
district may request an injunction against any person, firm, or corporation which 
disseminates or is about to disseminate any matter which is obscene. 
The person, fii"Dl, or corporation sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial 
on the· merits within one day after filing of reaponaive pleadings and a decision shall 
be rendered by the court within two daya of the conclusion of the trial. 
A justice of the superior court may issue a preliminary injunction pending the 
trial on the merits against such person, fii"Dl, or corporation which diaseminatea or 
is about to diaaeminate any matter which is obscene. 
No prsliminary injunction shall be iaaued without notice to the adverse party. 
If the court fmda that the ~rson, firm, or corporation is diaaem~ating or is about 
to disseminate any obscene matter, it shall issue a permanent inj~ction prohibit-
ing the dissemination of that matter. The court's order shall direct the person, fum 
or corporation to surrender to a sheriff or a police officer the matt!lr found obscene 
and a sheriff or police officer shall be directed to seize and destroy the same. . . . 
[A]ny party or intervenor shall have the right to an expedited appeal to the 
appeals court. 
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Court in Miller v. California. 2 During the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court reviewed the obscenity statutes in a variety of contexts. 
Perhaps the most significant of the cases decided by the Court was 
Commonwealth v. 707 Main Corp., 3 in which the Court generally upheld 
the overall constitutionality of the obscenity statute. The defendant in 
707 Main Corp. was found guilty in the superior court of two criminal 
violations of the obscenity statutes.• On appeal, the defendant raised 
three challenges to the statutes. First, the defendant contended that 
since the commonwealth had instituted a civil proceeding for an injunc-
tion against the showing of the film in question, under section 30 of 
chapter 272 it was collaterally estopped from proceeding criminally 
against him under section 29 of chapter 272.5 Second, the defendant 
maintained that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment• by providing disparate procedural protections 
depending upon whether the material in question was a "book."7 Third, 
The procedures set forth in this section are in addition to criminal proceedings 
initiated under any provisions of the General Laws, and not a condition precedent 
thereto. 
§ 31 [Definitions] 
"Disseminate," to import, publish, produce, print, manufacture, distribute, sell, 
lease, exhibit or display. 
"Knowing," a general awareness of the character of the matter. 
"Matter," any printed material, visual representation, live performance or sound 
recording including but not limited to books, magazines, motion picture films, 
pamphlets, phonographic records, pictures, photographs, figures, statutes, plays, 
dances. 
"Obscene," matter is obscene if taken as a whole it (1) appeals to prurient 
interest of the average person, applying the contemporary standards of the com-
monwealth; (2) depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and 
(3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
"Sexual conduct," human masturbation, sexual intercourse actual or simulated, 
normal or perverted, or any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the 
- human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between 
members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals, any depic-
tion or representation of excretory functions, any lewd exhibitions of the genitals, 
flagellation or torture in the context of a sexual relationship. Sexual intercourse is 
simulated when it depicts explicit sexual intercourse which gives the appearance 
of the consummation of sexual intercourse, normal or perverted. 
z 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2643, 357 N.E.2d 753. 
• Id. at 2643, 357 N.E.2d at 755; see G.L. c. 272, § 29. The charges arose from the 
defendants' showing of the film "Deep Throat" on two separate occasions. 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 2643, 357 N.E.2d at 755. 
• Id. at 2644, 357 N.E.2d at 755. 
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2644, 357 N.E.2d at 755. 3
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the defendant contended that the obscenity statute was overbroad and 
vague in violation of the first amendment8 and the due process provi-
sions of the fifth' and fourteenth10 amendments. 11 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the defendant's first challenge, 
based on collateral estoppel, on the grounds that the United States 
Supreme Court has left to state law determinations as to the collateral 
effect of prior findings of nonobscenity in subsequent proceedings. 12 The 
Court stated that the legislature had established a specific statutory 
design in the obscenity statutes capable of leaving as many procedural 
remedial options open to prosecutors as possible.t3 Moreover, the Court 
concluded that, by this design, the legislature intended to make avail-
able to prosecutors the concurrent use of civil and criminal proceedings 
for enforcement of the obscenity laws.14 Thus, the Court; held that the 
institution of a civil proceeding before a criminal proceeding does not 
estop action in the criminal proceeding. 15 
The defendant's second contention was that the Massachusetts stat-
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
• Id. at amend. V. 
11 /d. at amend. XIV, § 1. 
" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2644, 357 N.E.2d at 755-56. 
12 Id. at 2646, 357 N.E.2d at 756. This assumption by the Supreme Judicial Court may 
not be entirely accurate. In Miller, the Supreme Court refused to consider the issue of 
collateral estoppel on the grounds that the issue had not been raised properly in the 
California courts. 413 U.S. at 34. Moreover, the record in Miller did not reveal clearly how 
California law might resolve the question. Id. at 34 n.14. Thus, the Supreme Court merely 
remanded the collateral estoppel question to the California courts without expressing an 
opinion on the merits of the claim. Id. 
•• The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the legislative intent in enacting the statutes 
as providing law enforcement officials with as much flexibility as possible: "(The legisla-
ture) established a civil proceeding which would provide notice of potential criminal 
liability to disseminators of matter alleged to be obscene, while reserving for law enforce-
ment officials the right to use criminal proceedings as a primary enforcement tool when 
necessary." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2647, 357 N.E.2d at 757. 
•• Id. 
•• In 707 Main Corp. the commonwealth utilized the civil proceeding for injunctive relief 
pursuant to G.L. c. 272, § 30, concurrently with the crimnal proceeding pursuant to G.L. 
c. 272, § 29. See note 1 supra. After a trial on the merits, the judge in the civil action 
refused to enjoin the defendant from showing the film becaue the commonwealth had 
failed to prove it obscene. See District Attorney v. Three Way Theatres Corp., 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2665, 2665-66 & n.1, 357 N.E.2d 747, 748 & n.l. The commonwealth appealed, 
and while the appeal was pending, the defendant was convicted in the criminal proceed-
ing. 
While permitting concurrent utilization of both civil and criminal proceedings without 
collateral estoppel consequences, the Court in 707 Main Corp. emphasized that it was not 
deciding what result it would reach if the commonwelath had "tried ~d failed to obtain 
an injunction and thereafter, while appeal of an unfavorable result 1 was pending, pro-
ceeded with criminal prosecution. . . after the date of the civil decision, of the same 
allegedly obscene matter." Id. at 2647 n.3, 357 N.E.2d at 757 n.3 (emphasis in original). 
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utes violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion by requiring a civil proceeding to decide the issue of the material's 
"obscenity" as a condition precedent to criminal proceedings only when 
the material in question is a "book" .18 The defendant argued that the 
statutory distinction between books and other materials is discrimina-
tory and that the Court, applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, 
must find it unconstitutional. 17 
Responding to the defendant's equal protection argument, the Court 
first refused to apply strict scrutiny to the legislation in question, since 
the Court determined that the statute does not affect a fundamental 
right. 18 The Court indicated that the obscenity statutes do not purport 
to distinguish between books and magazines for the purpose of deter-
mining whether any given content is obscene. On the contrary, the 
Court noted that the statutes provide a procedure to litigate the line 
between obscenity and protected speech in all cases. 11 The Court ob-
served that the classifications established in the obscenity statutes are 
content neutral-they distinguish between "books" and "other species 
of materials," not between first amendment protected speech and non-
protected speech.20 The mere fact that the statutes additionally estab-
lish a separate procedure for one category of materials does not demand 
that the Court apply strict scrutiny to the entire scheme. Thus, the 
Court applied the traditional rational basis test to the obscenity stat-
utes.21 Having determined that the appropriate standard for its review 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2648-49, 357 N.E.2d at 757-58. 
G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-28D provide for an in rem civil proceeding to determine whether a 
"book" is obscene. This proceeding must precede the initiation of any criminal action 
against the disseminator of the book. A decree issuing from the civil proceeding is conclu-
sive evidence on the issue of criminal .knowledge of the book's obscenity. See G.L. c. 272, 
§ 28H. No similar procedure is available for materials other than books. See generally note 
1 supra. 
17 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2649, 357 N.E.2d at 758 . 
•• ld. 
11 ld. at 2650, 357 N.E.2d at 758. 
The Court asserted that the procedures outlined in G.L. c. 272, §§ 29-30 afforded 
constitutionally adequate protections to disseminators of materials other than "books." 
G.L. c. 272, § 29, the criminal section of the obscenity statutes, encompasses within its 
proscription of "obscene matter" "hard core" sexual conduct as specifically described by 
the United States Supreme Court in Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 and Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 
U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974). Moreover, the allegedly obscene matter must satisfy a three-
pronged test set out in G.L. c. 272, § 31, which parallels the test established in Miller. 
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
G.L. c. 272, § 30 provides for injunctive relief against dissemination of obscene matter 
and is procedurally identical with § 29 on the issue of "obscenity." 
20 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2649-50, 357 N.E.2d at 758. 
21 Id. at 2650-51, 357 N.E.2d at 758-59. 
The application of the rational basis test normally results in the Court's upholding the 
challenged statute. "[l]t has been our frequently stated rule that a statutory classifiction 
5
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of the obscenity statutes was the rational basis test, the Court had little 
difficulty disposing of the defendant's equal protection challenge. The 
Court identified a variety of justications to explain the disparity of 
procedural routes created in the legislation. 22 Therefore; the Court con-
cluded that a rational basis exists for the distinction between books and 
other types of material. 23 
The third challenge to the obscenity statutes raised by the defendant 
in 707 Main Corp. involved the contention that the Massachusetts stat-
ute was overbroad24 in its defmitions of "obscene" matter and "criminal 
knowledge" and that the definition of "obscenity" was insufficiently 
specific "to provide adequate notice of proscribed cop.duct."26 In re-
sponse, the Court concluded that since the statutory definition of 
"obscene"11 generally reflects the definition adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court in Miller, 27 it is sufficiently specific to avoid an 
will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection or due proceas if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywell Co., 366 
Maas. 539, 542, 320 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1974) (emphasis added); see, e.s., Colella v. State 
Racing Comm'n, 360 Maas. 152, 155-56, 274 N.E.2d 331, 334-35 (1971). 
11 1976 Maas. Adv. Sh. at 2651, 357 N.E.2d at 759. 
II fd. 
" The overbreadth doctrine is a mode of judicial scrutiny epitomized by NAACP v. 
Alabama, 377 U~S. 288 (1964), where the Court explained that "a governmental purpOse 
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be 
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 
protected freedoms. "ld. at 307 (emphasis added). In application, a statute which prohib-
ita both protected and unprotected speech is unconstitutionally overbroad. See Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
In the context of first amendment claims, the Court has consistently held that tradi-
tional rules of standing do not apply because "the Firat Amendment needs breathing 
space" and "the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain 
from constitutionally protected speech or expl:eBBion." Id. at 611-12. Thus the statute will 
be struck down even if the particular defendant's speech clearly is unprotected and thus 
legitimately controllable by the terms of the statute. See id.; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479, 486 (1965). But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (void-for-vagueness 
challenge). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. 
RBv. 844 (1970). 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has indicated ita unwillingneas to invoke the 
overbreadth doctrine, except "sparingly and only as a last resort." Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Consistent with this reluctance, the Court warned that 
"[f]acial overbreadth has not been invoked w~n a limiting construction has been or 
could be placed on the challenged statute." ld. (emphasis added). Therefore, since the 
Court has held that "obscene material is unprotected by the Firat ~endment," Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. at 23, a state statute regulating obscene materials may be upheld 
so long as the statute's reach does not exceed permiasible parameter&. See id. at 23-24. 
11 1976 Maas. Adv. Sh. at 2651, 357 N.E.2d at 759. 
11 G.L. c. 272, § 31. See note 1 supra. 
11 According to the Court in Miller, in order to determine whether a work is obscene: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commi.Jnity standards" 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/13
§10.1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 183 
overbreadth attack. 28 The Court added that since the statutory defini-
tion of "knowing"21 is "a general awareness of the character" of the 
matter disseminated, it is not overbroad. 30 The Court adverted to the 
1974 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hamling v. United 
States, which held that a defendant need be aware only of the contents 
and general character of the disseminated matter.31 
The Court was equally unwilling to accept the defendant's argument 
that the obscenity statutes should be declared void for vagueness.32 The 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
content specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
21 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 2652, 357 N.E.2d at 759. 
Moreover, the Court concluded tht the statute afforded the defendant constitutionally 
adequate procedural protections, since there existed a provision requiring an adversary 
proceeding leading to a judicial determination on all iBBues. Id: 
" G.L. c. 272, § 31. See note 1 supra. 
31 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2652-53, 357 N.E.2d at 759-60. 
31 418 u.s. 87, 123 (1974). 
33 In Commonwealth v. Thureson, 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 2659, 357 N.E.2d 750, decided 
the same day as 707 Main Corp., the Court held that in a criininal proceeding under G.L. 
c. 272, § 29 the prosecution has the burden of proving that a defendant had knowledge of 
the contents of the matter distributed. Thureson, 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 2661-62, 357 
N.E.2d at 752. See text and notes 73-84 infra. This holding comports with the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Hamling, which was decided when the MaBBachusetts 
obscenity statutes were still under consideration by the legislature. 
An issue that constantly arises in criminal prosecutions for obscenity centers around the 
concept of "scienter," or criminal intent. Generally, an individual cannot be convicted of 
a crime under American criminal jurisprudence without the concurrence of a criminal act 
(actus reus) and a criminal intent (mens rea, or "scienter"). See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 
122-24. There are a few exceptions to this generalization, where criminal liability may be 
imposed on a "strict liability" basis, without the neceBBity of proving criminal intent. 
However, these exceptions are rare and generally center around public welfare offenses. 
In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Court recognized that some strict liability 
crimes were valid, but added that where a crime had some relationship to first amendment 
freedom of speech, some form of scienter need be proven in order to eliminate any chilling 
effect on the distribution and availability of materials within the ambit of first amend-
ment protection. ld. at 154-55. The Court elaborated on this theme in 1974 in Hamling. 
There, the Supreme Court specified that proof of "knowledge of the contents. . ., the 
character and nature of the materials" is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement and 
that it need not be shown that the defendant believed the material to be obscene. 
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 123. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a mode of judicial analysis sufficiently similar to 
overbreadth analysis that the two claims are frequently 888erted in the same action. See, 
e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). It is important to recognize, however, 
that the two claims are different. The overbreadth doctrine invalidates a statute for 
impermissibly impinging upon protected activities; the void-for-vagueness doctrine inval-
idates a statute for failure to provide fair warning of prohibited conduct. See generally 
Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 76 
7
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Court determined that the definitions of "obscene" matter and "sexual" 
conduct contained in the statute were sufficient to provide reasonably 
ascertainable standards of guilt and thus were capable of withstanding 
a vagueness challenge.33 
In a brief dissent to 707 Main Corp., 34 Justice Kaplan indicated that 
he would hold the statute in question unconstitutional, adhering to the 
views previously expressed by Justice Brennan, that "at least in the 
absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsent-
ing adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State 
and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually 
oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents. "35 
While there may be grounds for legitimate disagreement with the 
(1960). The void-for-vagueness doctrine stems from the consistent holding of the Supreme 
Court that due process of law requires that "the person of ordinary intelligence . . . [must 
be given] a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see, e.g., Broadrick v. Okalhoma, 418 U.S. 601, 607 
(1973); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967) (distinguishing vagueness from 
overbreadth claims). 
The due proceBS requirement that a statute provide an ascertainable standard of guilt, 
however, means that the statute must contain a "comprehensible normative standard." 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). Thus the Supreme Court has 
invalidated statutes for failure to give fair warning generally where the statute provided 
no standard whatever. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974); Connally v. 
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
Where first amendment considerations are involved, the Court has indicated that the 
law must be written with greater specificity because of the potential "chilling effect" on 
the exercise of protected activities. See, e.g., Smith v. Gogruen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 & n.5 (1972). NonetheleBS, even though a 
statute may contain some peripheral vagueneBS, a defendant must demonstrate that the 
statute is vague concerning his conduct: 
None of [our cases] suggests that one who has received fair warning of the crimi-
nality of his own conduct from the statute in question is nonetheless entitled to 
attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to 
other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit. One to whose 
conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (emphasis added); United States v. Harriss, 347 
U.S. 612, 618 (1954). Compare Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (overbreadth challenges). 
11 For the statutory definitions of "obscene" and "sexual conduct," see note 1supra. In 
order to further clarify the situation for triers of fact and the public generally, the Court 
specified in a definitive manner what expreBSiofl is constitutionally protected and what 
expression is obscene. See generally 1976 Adv. Sh. at 2654-57, 357 N.E.2d at 760-61. 
14 Id. at 2658, 357 N.E.2d at 761-62 (Kaplan, J., dissenting). 
11 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., diBSenting); 
see Miller, 413 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Justice Kaplan further indicated that he would declare the obscenity statute unconsti-
tutional under the Massachusetts Constitution. 1976 MaBS. Adv. Sh. at 2658, 357 N .E.2d 
at 762. 
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holding of the Court in 707 Main Corp., 38 it seems apparent that, as far 
as it goes, the case is consistent with the recent pronouncements of the 
United States Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the 
Supreme Judicial Court could have taken the opportunity presented in 
707 Main Corp. to minimize the situations which would impose criminal 
penalties on expressive activities. For example, an objection generally 
levied at obscenity statutes is that they potentially can subject individu-
als to criminal penalties unfairly since the concept of what is or is not 
obscene is so difficult to define and is even more difficult to apply with 
any semblance of consistency. 
To minimize the potential for inequitable application of obscenity 
statutes, Chief Justice Burger has indicated that prior to exposing an 
individual to criminal penalties for exhibiting or purveying obscene 
material, a civil procedure designed solely to test the issue of obscenity 
should be employed. 37 The Massachusetts obscenity statutes represent 
an attempt by the legislature to respond to Chief Justice Burger's ca-
veat. Unfortunately, by providing a prior civil proceeding only for books, 
the response is incomplete and thus tends to cloud further this already 
turbid area of law.38 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 753, 361 
N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Liacos, J., concurring). 
11 See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1973) (approving the Georgia 
civil procedures as giving "the best possible notice, prior to any criminal indict· 
ments ... "). In his dissent from Miller, Justice Douglas also emphasized the potential 
for inequitable application of obscenity statutes: "Obscenity-which even we cannot de-
fine with precision-is a hodge-podge. To send men to jail for violating standards they 
cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated 
to fair trials and due process." Miller, 413 U.S. at 43-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
11 It is true that Chief Justice Burger's suggestion is dicta and not binding as a matter 
of constitutional law. However, the Supreme Court has held that once a state has afforded 
a particular class the benefits of a specific proceeding the state may riot unreasonably 
withhold those same benefits from members of another class similarly situated. See 
generally Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
To be sure, there were other factors in Douglas and Griffin which make them distinguisha-
ble. Both involved appeals from criminal convictions and the Court held that the chal-
lenged statutes discriminated on the basis of "wealth." In Douglas, the state set up a 
statutory procedure for appealing criminal convictions that was available to any convicted 
individual who could afford counsel to pursue the procedure; indigents, on the other hand, 
could not have counsel appointed for appeal unless the state first determined that the 
appeal was not frivolous. 372 U.S. at 355-56. Similarly, in Griffin, the state set up a 
procedure of appeal of criminal convictions requiring a transcript of the trial proceedings 
which was available free of charge only to indigents sentenced to death. 351 U.S. at 14 & 
n.5. The Supreme Court found that both state statutes violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357 -58; Griffin, 351 
U.S. at 19. 
The interesting aspect of Douglas and Griffin is that the Court struck down the respec-
tive statutory procedures even though they did not find that there is a constitutional 
"right" to a criminal appeal. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18; cf. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356 
9
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Even though a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court might be un-
willing to find a "suspect" classification or fundamental right involved 
in the obscenity statutes, thereby necessitating a strict scrutiny analy-
sis, a traditional rational basis analysis nevertheless could have been 
applied in a meaningful manner. The Court could easily have deter-
mined that no rational basis exists for discriminating between sellers of 
books and sellers of magazines in the extent of procedural protection 
available. at 
Requiring a prior civil proceeding for all material in this confusing and 
uncertain area would put the seller on notice that he is engaging in 
conduct which may be unlawful and afford the seller the opportunity of 
conforming his conduct to law before criminal sanctions are imposed. 
Moreover, such a procedure would maximize first amendment protec-
tions by reducing the potential "chilling effect" of the existing legisla-
tion.40 
In addition to 707 Main Corp., a number of cases were decided by the 
Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year which further clarified 
the obscenity statutes. In Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 41 the 
Court defined the word "book" as used in the Massachusetts obscenity 
statutes. 42 
The defendant in Zone Book was charged with possession of obscene 
(California law granted appeal as a matter of right). Moreover, even though a majority of 
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to consider wealth a "suspect" classification requir-
ing strict judicial scrutiny, the Court nevertheless reviewed the statutes challenged in 
Douglas and Griffin very carefully, refusing to accept at face value the legislative purpose 
for the claBBification. This analysis is indicative of a trend by the majority of the Supreme 
Court away from traditional two-tier equal protection analysis. See San Antonio Ind. 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., diBBenting). 
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 743, 756-57, 361 
N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (Liacos, J., concurring). 
• There appears to be some support for the proposition that, where first amendment 
freedoms are involved, books should be afforded more protection than other materials. In 
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973), Chief Justice Burger, writing for a divided 
Court, observed in a footnote that: 
This Court, since Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), has only once held 
books to be obscene. That case was Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), and 
the books involved were very similar in content to [the book forming the basis of 
this conviction]. But most of the Mishkin books, if not all, were illustrated .... 
Prior to Roth, this Court affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a conviction for 
sale of an unillustrated book. Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 
(1948) [per curiam]. This Court has always rigorously scrutinized judgments 
involving books for possible violation of First Amendment rights, and has regularly 
reversed convictions on that basis. 
ld. at 118 n.3 (emphasis added) (some citations omitted). 
•• 1977 M8BB. Adv. Sh. 743, 361 N.E.2d 1239. 
•• See G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-28E, 28G-28H. See note 1 supra. 
10
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magazines with intent to distribute them in violation of section 29 of 
chapter 272.43 The defendant filed motions to dismiss the complaints, 
alleging that the material possessed constituted books, not magazines, 
and thus, as a condition precedent to a criminal proceeding under sec-
tion 29, 1;pe commonwealth was required to institute in rem procedures 
as set forth in sections 28C-28H of chapter 272.44 
The obscenity statutes provide that before any criminal proceeding 
may be instituted against an individual for dissemination of obscene 
books, there must first be an in rem civil proceeding to determine 
whether the books in question are obscene." However, while the statute 
defines "matter" broadly to include any printed material, 41 it does not 
define "books." 
After reviewing the definitions of "books" and "magazines" in other 
contexts, the Court concluded that "a substantial printed publication 
is a book for the purposes of G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-31, if it is complete in 
itself, betraying no evidence of continuation with publications of a simi-
lar nature issued at regular periodic intervals. " 47 The Court then va-
cated the denials of defendants' motions and remanded the case for 
dismissal as to both complaints.48 
In essence, the Court held that it is the element of periodicity which 
distinguishes "books" from other materials and that if "books" are in-
volved, a civil proceeding must precede any criminal action.41 The bur-
den of proof on the issue of whether a publication is a book or a magazine 
rests on the defendant and must be timely raised by a motion to dismiss 
before trial. 00 
It is interesting to note that the Court in Zone Book recognized the 
43 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 743, 361 N.E.2d at 1240. 
•• Upon denial of these motions the defendant petitioned for and was granted a transfer 
of the cases to the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, §§ 3, 4A. 1977 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 744, 361 N.E.2d at 1241. 
41 G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-D. The material in question in Zone Book consisted of two 
publications, each of more than forty pages in length, "bound by staples and containing 
a series of photographs with incidental text but no advertising or variety in subject mat-
ter." 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 744, 361 N.E.2d at 1241 (footnote omitted). One of the 
publications had Volume I written on its cover but there was no identification of the 
photographers, editors, or publishers. ld. 
41 G.L. c. 272, § 31. See note 1 supra. 
' 7 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 749, 361 N.E.2d at 1243. 
41 Id. at 751, 361 N.E.2d at 1244. 
•• Id. at 747, 361 N.E.2d at 1242 . 
.. See Commonwealth v. Ferro, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 761, 769, 361 N.E.2d 1234, 1238-
39. 
The Court interpreted G.L. c. 272, § 280, to permit a defendant in a § 29 or § 30 
proceeding to move for dismissal by proving that the allegedly obscene material dissemi-
nated fits the defmition of "book," and that the prosecutor had not proceeded in rem 
against the book pursuant to G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-28H. 
11
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value of the in rem proceeding for all materials both from the perspec-
tive of the potential defendant who disseminates materials which he 
believed in good faith to be non-obscene as well as from the perspective 
of the "general public who wish to obtain, without self-censorship by 
disseminators fearing criminal or civil disability, materials which are 
not obscene but which are close to the obscenity line."51 Nevertheless, 
because a prior in rem proceeding is not mandated by the United States 
Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional law, the Court was unwill-
ing to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.52 
In Commonwealth v. Ferro, 53 decided the same day as Zone Book, the 
Court was called upon to interpret further the obscenity laws. The de-
fendant in Ferro was charged with and convicted for possession of ob-
scene magazines with an intent to disseminate them in violation of 
section 29 of chapter 272.54 The trial court held that the defendant was 
not entitled to a prior in rem proceeding under G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-28H. 
While the judge denied the defendant's motions to dismiss, he neverthe-
less submitted the issues raised by the motions to the jury.55 The Su-
preme Judicial Court was not persuaded by the defendant's constitu-
tional arguments but did remand the case for hearing on the issue of 
whether or not the material in question fell within its definitions of 
"books"58 and therefore was subject to an in rem proceeding as a condi-
tion precedent to the criminal proceeding.57 
Relying on its decision in 707 Main Corp., the Court quickly disposed 
of defendant's argument that the statute violates the equal protection 
clause of the United States Constitution in its distinction between 
"books" and "magazines."58 However, the Court did reflect further on 
the basis for the distinction between "books" and "magazines," justify-
ing the requirement of a prior civil proceeding for books on their lack of 
periodic publication.59 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 748 n.4, 361 N.E.2d at 1242 n.4. 
12 ld. Justice Kaplan apparently would not be as constrained as a majority of the 
Supreme Judicial Court on this question. Accepting the reluctance of a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court to invalidate obscenity laws in general, he would invalidate 
the obscenity laws on the basis of the Massachusetts Constitution. See Commonwealth 
v. 707 Main Corp., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2658, 357 N.E.2d at 762 (Kaplan, J., dissent-
ing). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 761, 361 N.E.2d 1234. 
" ld. at 761, 361 N.E.2d at 1235. 
11 ld. at 762, 361 N.E.2d at 1235 . 
.. ld. at 770, 361 N.E.2d at 1239. For the Court's definition of "book" as enunciated in 
Zone Book, see text at note 47 supra. 
17 Ferro, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 769-70, 361 N.E.2d at 1239. 
11 ld. at 763-64, 361 N.E.2d at 1236. See text and notes 16-23 supra. 
11 Given the periodicity distinction that the Court emphasized in Zone Book, see text 
at note 47 supra, the Court opined that the legislature may well have concluded that 
magazines which appear in issues or numbers over a period of time place a retailer on 
12
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The defendant in Ferro raised an equal protection challenge to a 
classification in the obscenity statutes not raised in 707 Main Corp. The 
statutes make it an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution that 
the defendant disseminator is a "bona fide school, museum or library, 
or [who is] acting in the course of his employment as an employee of 
such an organization or of a retail outlet affiliated with and serving the 
educational purpose of such [an] organization."80 The defendant con-
tended that this classification of disseminators violated the equal pro-
tection provisions of the Massachusetts and the United States constitu-
tions.81 The Court rejected this equal protection argument. Particularly, 
after concluding that the classification did not affect a fundamental 
interest, 82 the Court upheld the statute because the classification 
scheme may have a rational basis.83 
The defendant contended further that the materials he possessed were 
"books" and thus the commonwealth had not complied with section 
281.14 In response, the Court took the opportunity to explain iri some 
detail the section 281 procedure.86 As an integral and indispensible part 
of the section 281 procedure the trial judge must determine whether the 
material disseminated is a "book" or other material.88 The judge's deci-
notice of their continuing quality. See Ferro, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 764, 361 N.E.2d at 
1236. This conjecture of purpose by the Court raises a typical criticism of traditional equal 
protection analysis. The so-called "old" equal protection analysis exemplified by the 
application of a rational basis test, often results in an exercise in mental gymnastics by a 
court in order to justify legislation that in reality was never premised on a valid basis. 
Rather than examining the true intent of the legislature in drawing the challenged distinc-
tion, as developed through a review of the legislative history, the court instead will create 
a possible purpose to save the statute from constitutional infirmity. See generally 
Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). 
" G.L. c. 272, § 29. 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 764, 361 N.E.2d at 1236. 
12 Id. at 764-65, 361 N.E.2d at 1236-37. 
13 Id. at 765, 361 N.E.2d at 1237. 
Since the classification in question did not involve the definition of obscenity, the Court 
was of the opinion that no question arose involving a potential infringement of protected 
first amendment expression. Therefore, the Court was able to use the rational basis analy-
sis rather than a more demanding strict scrutiny. See text at notes 16-23 supra. The Court 
indicated that the classification "may reflect a policy of protecting educational resources 
from use in obscenity litigation rather than social service while still proceeding to elimi-
nate public availability of obscene matter." Consequently, the classification "may have 
a rational basis." Ferro, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 765, 361 N.E.2d at 1237. 
u Id. at 767, 361 N.E.2d at 1238. For the text of G.L. c. 272, § 281, see note 1 supra. 
•• The Court, citing G.L. c. 277, § 47A, explained that a judge must comply with G.L. 
c. 272, § 281 before reaching the merits in any proceeding under § 29 or § 30. 1977 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 767-68 & n.3, 361 N.E.2d at 1238 & n.3. 
" It was on this issue that the trial judge in Ferro erred. Rather than decide as a matter 
of fact whether the disseminated material was a "book," the judge summarily denied the 
defendant's motion to dismiss raised at the trial on the merits without entertaining evi-
13
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sion on this issue is appealable either by the Commonwealth, 87 if the 
defendant's motion to dismiss is allowed, or after the trial by the defen-
dant if the motion is denied. The Court also discussed the type of evi-
dence that could be presented at a hearing on such a motion to dismiss. 
At a minimum the trial judge should receive as evidence at the hearing 
a copy of the material in question." Moreover, testimony of complete-
ness and lack of periodicity, presented by individuals accustomed to 
classifying publications by genre, may be received at the hearing, 18 and 
the Court may examine the material for evidence of continuity with 
other publications. 7° Finally, the burden of proof relative to whether the 
material is a book rests on the defendant in the motion to dismiss 
hearing.71 
In Fe"o, since the trial judge submitted the issue of whether the 
material was a "book" to the jury, neither the defendant nor the prose-
cution had an opportunity to present evidence relative to the periodicity 
of the material in question to the trial judge at a motion to dismiss 
hearing before a trial on the merits. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial 
Court remanded the case for a motion to dismiss hearing in the superior 
court.72 
The Court further interpreted the obscenity statutes during the 
Survey year in Commonwealth v. Thureson, 73 in which the defendant 
was charged with violation of section 29.74 The defendant, a cashier in a 
book store which advertised "peep" shows, had been working at the 
store for only two or three days before her arrest. 71 The defendant was 
arrested by a police officer with a search warrant after responding that 
dence on the iBBue and submitted the question to the jury. The Court made it clear that 
the trial judge does not determine whether the material is legally "obacene" at this 
hearing-only whether or not it is a "book." 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 769, 361 N.E.2d at 
1238. 
17 See G.L. c. 278, § 28E. 
u 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 769, 361 N.E.2d at 1238. 
u This type of evidence wu provided, and wu approved by the Court, in Zone Book. 
1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 749, 361 N.E.2d at 1243. 
71 Jd. at 750, 361 N.E.2d at 1243. 
The Court indicated that while e:~:pert testimony relative to a publication's cl888ifica-
tion for purposes of periodicity is not neceaaary, it is certainly proper for consideration by 
a trial judge in a hearing of this nature. The Court also streBSed that once the iBBue of 
whether the material ia a "book" baa been decided at the hearing on the motion to diamiBB 
it should not be relitigated u part of a trial on the merits. Ferro, 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 
769, 361 N .E.2d at 1238. 
71 On the other hand, the burden of showing compliance with the required § 281 in rem 
procedure is 9n the Commonwealth. ld., 361 N .E. 2d at 1239. 
71 I d. at 770, 361 N .E.2d at 1239. 
11 1976 M888. Adv. Sh. 2659, 357 N.E.2d 750. 
74 G.L. c. 272, § 29. For the teJ:t of § 29, aee note 1 supra. 
71 1976 M888. Adv. Sh. at 2659-60, 357 N.E.2d at 751. 
14
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she had "a pretty good idea" when asked if she knew what kind of 
pictures were shown in the machines located in the store.78 At trial, the 
defendant testified that she worked alone in the store, did not know who 
her employer was, and had performed no tasks relative to the "peep" 
show machines except making change. 77 The prosecution introduced no 
evidence to show that the defendant had ever viewed the contents of the 
"peep" show machines.78 The trial judge denied the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict for insufficient evidence of the defendant's knowl-
edge, and she was found guilty by a jury of violating section 29 of the 
obscenity statutes.78 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed.110 
The Court recognized that in order to convict a defendant of criminal 
dissemination of obscene materials, it is necessary that the prosecution 
prove that the defendant "had knowledge of the contents of the matter 
distributed."81 "The prosecution must produce evidence from which a 
jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had 
seen, or should have seen, or otherwise had knowledge of, the material's 
contents. "82 
The Court concluded that the evidence presented in Thureson did not 
reasonably lead to an inference that the defendant "had viewed or had 
reason to view, or otherwise had knowledge of, the contents"83 of the 
"peep" shows. Therefore, the Court held that the evidence failed to 
support a finding of a violation of section 29.84 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court also decided 
District Attorney v. Three Way Theatres Corp., 85 a case involving three 
civil suits commenced pursuant to section 30 of the obscenity statutes. 88 
71 Id. at 2660, 357 N.E.2d at 751. 
77 ld. 
71 ld. 
7t Id. 
11 Id. at 2663, 357 N.E.2d at 752. 
•• Id. at 2662, 357 N.E.2d at 752. 
The burden on the prosecution is to demonstrate that the defendant knew of the con-
tents of the material. There is no burden on the prosecution to prove that the defendant 
knew that the material in question was obscene as a matter oflaw. See Smith v. Califor-
nia, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959). See text and notes 30-32 supra. In addition, proof that 
the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the material in question may be estab-
lished by inference without the use of direct evidence. Thureson, 1976 MaBS. Adv. Sh. at 
2662, 357 N.E.2d at 752. 
u 1976 MaBS. Adv. Sh. at 2662, 357 N.E.2d at 752. 
u Id. at 2663, 357 N.E.2d at 752 . 
.. ld. 
While the defendant in this case raised a number of constitutional challenges to the 
obscenity statutes, the challenges were dismissed by the Court based on the other cases 
decided during the Survey year. 
II 1976 M888. Adv. Sh. 2665, 357 N.E.2d 747. 
II G.L. c. 272, § 30. $ection 30 confers jurisdiction on the superior court to enjoin the 
dissemination of obscene material. This procedure is available to any district attorney or 
15
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The plaintiffs in the suits were district attorneys from three separate 
districts, who "each alleged that a corporate defendant was exhibiting 
obscene motion pictures and requested injunctive relief."87 
At the trial in the superior court the judge viewed the motion picture 
films alleged to be obscene and heard expert testimony offered by both 
the plaintiffs and the defendants. Applying the Miller test, 88 the trial 
judge "found that the films lacked any serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value and that they appealed to prurient interest."8' How-
ever, the judge ruled that the films were not obscene, as that term is 
defined in section 31 of chapter 272, because the plaintiffs had failed to 
show by a preponderance of evidence, and, particularly, had failed to 
present expert testimony indicating, that the films depicted sexual con-
duct in a patently offensive way .10 
The plaintiffs appealed, alleging that it was prejudicial error for the 
trial judge to require expert testimony on the issue of the "patent offen-
siveness" of the filnis.'1 The defendants cross-appealed, alleging that the 
obscenity statutes violate the equal protection clause by affording a jury 
trial to defendants in proceedings established for the prosecution of 
books, while denying a jury trial to defendants in section 30 proceed-
ings.'2 
Citing the United States Supreme Court decision in Kaplan v. 
California, 83 the Supreme Judicial Court found no constitutional re-
quirement that expert testimony be offered on the issue of obscenity 
the Attorney General in addition to any criminal procedures provided in the obscenity 
statutes and is not a condition precedent to criminal proceedings. Furthermore, unlike § 
28R, this section does not distinguish between "books" and other materials and does not 
provide for a jury trial. 
87 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2665, 357 N.E.2d at 748. The case originally involved three 
separate civil cases each commenced in a different county. The cases were consolidated 
and tried before a superior court judge in Middlesex County. 
88 See note 27 supra. 
0 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2666, 357 N.E.2d at 748. 
10 I d. The trial judge concluded that, as a trier of fact, he could not decide whether the 
average citizen of MaBSachusetts would think the films were "patently offensive." He was 
of the opinion that expert testimony was necessary on this issue.Jd. at 2667-68, 357 N .E.2d 
at 749. 
11 ld. at 2666, 357 N.E.2d at 748. The plaintiffs also alleged on appeal that the trial 
judge's ruling that the films did not depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner 
was clearly erroneous. 
•z ld., 357 N.E.2d at 748-49. The § 30 proceedings are the only civil proceedings avail-
able to control materials other than books. 
Defendants also claimed that the obscenity statutes violate the due process provisions 
of both the United States and the MaBBachusetts Constitutions. However, the Supreme 
Judicial Court disagreed on the basis of its opinion in 707 Main Corp. See Three Way 
Theatres Corp., 1976 M888. Adv. Sh. at 2667, 357 N.E.2d at 749 . 
.. 413 u.s. 115 (1973). 
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itself or on any ancillary issue.84 Moreover, the Court held that the 
offering of such evidence is not required by the obscenity statute. The 
Court recognized that the phrase "contemporary community standard" 
in the statutory definition of obscenity95 bars the trier of.fact from using 
personal views or peculiar group views as a measure of obscenity. How-
ever, the Court determined that the phrase does allow the trier of fact 
to apply his own knowledge of normative sensibilities to hard core depic-
tions of sexual conduct in Massachusetts96 in deciding whether material 
is "patently offensive" as that concept is used in the statute; and that 
such determinations may be made by the trier of fact in the absence of 
expert testimony. Thus, because the trial judge incorrectly required 
expert testimony on the issue of community standards for proof of ob-
scenity the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment and re-
manded the case for further consideration.U7 
The Court disposed of the defendant's constitutional challenges to the 
statute by referring to the previously decided case of Commonwealth v. 
707 Main Corp. 98 Applying a rational basis standard of review, the Court 
concluded that the denial of a jury trial to defendants in section 30 
proceedings is justified because section 30 proceedings are injunctive in 
nature. Such proceedings therefore require speedy adjudications to 
avoid restraint of a mode of expression which may be constitutionally 
protected. 99 
The Massachusetts obscenity statutes represent a legislative attempt 
to control obscene material in a manner consistent with the constitu-
tional parameters announced by the United States Supreme Court. The 
Survey year obscenity opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court, while 
open to some criticism grounded in the Court's application of a rational 
basis standard of review to equal protection challenges to the statutes, 
14 Three Way Theatres Corp., 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2667-68, 357 N.E.2d at 749. See 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) (holding that expert testimony is 
unnecessary in obscenity cases). 
11 G.L. c. 272, § 31. 
" The Court interpreted the definition of "sexual conduct" in § 31 as including only 
"hard core" sexual conduct as described in Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). It is interesting 
to note that the Massachusetts obscenity statute refers to "statewide" community stan-
dards in its definition of obscenity. See G.L. c. 272, § 31. The United States Supreme 
Court has indicated that the "Constitution does not require that juries be instructed in 
state obscenity cases to apply the standards of a hypothetical state-wide community" and 
that instructions to apply" 'community standards' [are appropriate] without specifying 
what 'community.'" Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). 
" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2668, 357 N.E.2d at 749. 
" See text and notes 3-40 supra. 
" The in rem proceedings of G.L. c. 272, §§ 28C-281 are not injunctive in nature and a 
speedy adjudication is not constitutionally required. Therefore, jury trials may be af-
forded. 
17
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generally clarified the substantive reach and procedural application of 
the statutes. 
§ 10.2. Libel: Standaid of Proof. During the Survey year, the Su-
preme Judicial Court had occasion to refine once again the law of libel 
in Massachusetts. In Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 1 the 
Court addressed the issue of the standard of proof in first amendment 
libel cases. 
The plaintiff in Callahan, a member of the Boston Licensing Board 
at the time of the alleged libel, acknowledged that he was a "public 
official" and thus allowed the Court to avoid this still rather ambiguous 
issue.2 The plaintiff's sole argument on appeal was that the trial judge 
§10.2. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1025, 363 N.E.2d 240. 
2 Even had plaintiff not conceded this iuue, it seems clear that his position with the 
Boston Licensing Board would qualify him as a "public official." Therefore, consistent 
with the Supreme Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 
the plaintiff may only recover damages for defamation if "he proves that the statement 
was made with 'actual malice' -that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckleu 
disregard of whether it was false or not." ld. at 279-80. 
The application of the "actual malice" standard has heen the focus of considerable 
Supreme Court attention in the years following New York Times. In 1967, the Court 
extended the actual malice standard to "public figures." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Four years later, the Court appeared to replace this status 
approach, which focuses on the identity of the parties involved, with a content approach, 
which focuses on the nature of the subject matter involved. See Rosenbloom v. Metrome-
dia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
the Court retreated to the status approach by holding that "so long as they do not impose 
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of 
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual." ld. at 347 (footnote omitted). See generally Eaton, The American Law of 
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 
VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975). 
The Supreme Judicial Court set the standard for Massachusetts in 1975. In Stone v. 
Euex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N .E.2d 161 (1975), the Court held that 
"a plaintiff who is not a public officer or a public figure may recover damages in an action 
for libel by proof of negligence in the publishing of the libel. . . . " I d. at 851, 330 N .E.2d 
at 164. For a comprehensive discuuion of Stone, see Cronin, Constitutional Law, 1974 
ANN. Suav. MABB. LAw § 10.1. 
The Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), amplified its defini-
tion of "public figure." There, the Supreme Court seemed to return to the content ap-
proach of Rosenbloom in the context of its public figure analysis. According to Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Firestone: 
Diuolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of "public 
controversy" referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely 
wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading public. . . . 
[Ms. Firestone] assumed no "apecial prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions." Gertz, (418 U.S.] at 351. We hold respondent was not a "public figure" 
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Firestone, maintained that 
the distinction between public figures and private individuals drawn by the Court in 
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erred in defining "clear and convincing proof'' for the jury.3 
The plaintiff conceded that as a public official he had the burden of 
persuading the jury by "clear and convincing proof'' that the defendants 
had knowledge of the falsity of their statements or that they acted in 
reckless disregard of the truth.• The plaintiff contended, however, that 
the trial judge had imposed an excessively high burden of proof by 
instructing the jury that "[t]he word 'convincing' after the word 'clear' 
. . . suggests to me that there should not be too much room for argu-
ment among reasonable men and women under the standard .... "• 
The Court began its discussion of plaintiff's argument by noting that 
the phrase "clear and convincing proof'' had been utilized infrequently 
in Massachusetts because of its vagueness as a standard. 6 However, the 
Court had felt obligated to adopt the standard in libel cases as a result 
of Supreme Court precedent, and did so in Stone v. Essex County News-
papers, Inc. 7 The Court did not attempt in Stone to articulate a precise 
form of instructions defining "clear and convincing proof. "K Neverthe-
less, the Court considered the trial judge's charge in Callahan a com-
mendable effort "to describe the elusive intermediate level of burden of 
persuasion in terms which the jury could understand."u 
In order to avoid future problems, the Callahan Court, in a footnote 
to its opinion, suggested a form of instruction defining "clear and con-
vincing proof:" 
The burden [of persuasion] is not a burden of convincing you 
that the facts which are asserted are certainly true or that they are 
Firestone was precisely the distinction drawn five years earlier in Rosenbloom and subse-
quently rejected in Gertz. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 488-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1025, 363 N.E.2d at 241. 
• Id.; see Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849,851, 330 N.E.2d 161, 
164 (1975). 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1029-30, 363 N.E.2d at 243. 
1 /d. !lt 1026, 363 N.E.2d at 241; see Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 
849, 870 & n.10, 330 N.E.2d 161, 174-75 & n.10 (1975). 
7 367 Mass. 849, 330 N .E.2d 161 (1975). In Stone, the Supreme Judicial Court expressed 
some concern with its adoption of the "clear and convincing proof' standard, but felt that 
the imposition of such a standard was mandated by the Supreme Court in Gertz and New 
York Times. Id. at 870, 330 N.E.2d at 174-75. 
' According to the Court in Stone: 
The New York Times and the Gertz cases offer no definition of the meaning of 
"clear and convincing proof," to assist in formulating jury instructions. However, 
from other sources we find the phrase defined. Clear and convincing proof involves 
a degree of belief greater than the usually imposed burden of proof by a fair prepon-
derance of the evidence, but less than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt imposed in criminal cases. . . . [T]he proof must be "strong, positive and 
free from doubt" . . ., and "full, clear and decisiv~· . . . . 
367 Mass. at 871, 330 N.E.2d at 175 (citations omitted). 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1031, 363 N.E.2d at 243. 
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almost certainly true, or are true beyond a reasonable doubt. It is, 
however, greater than a burden of convincing you that the facts are 
more probably true than false. The burden imposed is to convince 
you that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the prob-
ability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the 
probability that they are false or do not exist. If then you believe 
upon consideration and comparison of all the evidence in the case 
that there is a high degree of probability that the facts are true you 
must find that the facts have been proved. 10 
The Court in Callahan made no significant substantive statement 
altering the law of defamation in Massachusetts. Nonetheless, by pro-
viding a reasonably clear and comprehensible jury instruction for the 
standard of proof in first amendment libel cases, the Court has clarified 
one area of uncertainty in what has heretofore been generally murky 
terrain. 11 
§ 10.3. Corporate First Amendment Rights. 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
constitutionality of section 8 of chapter 55 of the General Laws, which 
prohibits the expenditure of corporate funds for the purpose of influenc-
ing any vote on referendum questions not "materially affecting any of 
the property, business or assets of the corporation."• The Court in First 
National Bank v. Attorney General2 sustained the statute. 
10 /d. at 1032 n.3, 363 N.E.2d at 244 (quoting from McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees 
of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242, 263-64 (1944)). 
11 For a further discussion of Callahan, see Mone and Finn, Torts, supra § 5.3. 
§ 10.3. 1 G.L. c. 55, § 8 provides in pertinent part: 
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, trust, surety, indemnity, safe 
deposit, insurance, railroad, street railway, telegraph, telephone, gas, electric light, 
heat, power, canal, aqueduct, or water company, no company having the right to 
take land by eminent domain or to exercise franchises in public ways, granted by 
the commonwealth or by any county, city or town, no trustee or trustees owning or 
holding the majority of the stock of such a corporation, no business corporation 
incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth and no 
officer or agent acting in behalf of any corporation mentioned in this section, shall 
directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or promise to give, pay, 
expend or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of aiding, 
promoting or preventing the nomination or election of any person to public office, 
or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any political party, or influenc-
ing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one 
materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. No 
question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, 
property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the 
property, business or assets of the corporation .... 
Any corporation violating any provision of this section shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than fifty thousand dollars . . . . 
' 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 134, 359 N.E.2d 1262, rev'd, _U.S._, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371 
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Plaintiffs3 in First National sought a declaratory judgment from the 
Supreme Judicial Court, "alleging that they intended to expend moneys 
to publicize, by newspaper advertisements and other similar methods"4 
their opposition to a 1976 referendum question which proposed the im-
position of a graduated individual income tax in the commonwealth." 
Plaintiffs claimed both that the proposed referendum question would, 
if adopted, "substantially and materially effect their business activi-
ties"8 and that the statute was unconstitutional both on its face and as 
applied.7 
The Court summarily disposed of plaintiffs' claim that the individual 
income tax would materially affect their businesses by finding that the 
claim was not supported by the record. 8 Moreover, the Court observed 
that the statute explicitly prohibited corporate expenditures in connec-
tion with referenda limited to individual income tax questions.' 
Reaching plaintiffs' constitutional claims, 10 the Court granted that 
first amendment rights were involved. 11 However, the Court remarked 
that "a corporation does not have the same First Amendment rights to 
free speech as those of a natural person" and concluded that the first 
amendment rights of corporations derive solely from the corporation's 
property rights under the fourteenth amendment. 12 Specifically, the 
Court held that "only when a general political issue materially affects 
a corporation's business, property or assets may that corportion claim 
First Amendment protection for its speech or other activities entitling 
it to communicate its position on that issue to the general public."•:s 
Thus, the Court upheld the challenged statute against the claim that it 
(U.S. April 25, 1978). For a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's reversal, see note 24 
infra. 
s In addition to the First National Bank of Boston, plaintiffs were New England Mer-
chants National Bank, The Gillette Company, Digital Equipment Corporation and 
Wyman-Gordon Company. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 134 n.1, 359 N.E.2d at 1262 n.l. 
• Id. at 134, 359 N.E.2d at 1265. 
• ld. at 134-35 & n.3, 359 N.E.2d at 1265 & n.3. 
1 /d. at 137, 359 N.E.2d at 1266. 
7 /d. at 144, 359 N.E.2d at 1268-69. 
• Id. at 138, 359 N.E.2d at 1266. 
1 /d. See note 1 supra. 
11 The defendant had raised two procedural objections to the court's consideration of 
the case: whether the case was ripe for adjudication without a full trial on the merits and 
whether the case involved an actual controversy under G.L. c. 231A, § 1. Considering the 
massive record before it and the nature of the issues, the court found both arguments 
without merit. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 142-43, 359 N.E.2d at 1268. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 145, 359 N.E.2d at 1269. 
12 /d. at 147, 359 N.E.2d at 1270. But see Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 
500-01 (1952) (first amendment guarantees within the liberty interests of the fourteenth 
amendment). 
•s /d. at 148, 359 N.E.2d at 1270. 
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was unconstitutional on its face, since the statute permitted expendi-
tures of corporate funds to influence the outcome of election materially 
affecting corporate business.•• 
Plaintiffs also claimed that the challenged statute should be declared 
overbroad15 and void for vagueness.t• The overbreadth challenge was 
grounded in the plaintiffs' claim that the challenged statute could be 
read to proscribe the use of "in-house" newspapers or bulletins discuss-
ing a personal income tax. 17 The Court construed the statute to exclude 
expenditures for such publications and therefore found that the statute 
was not overbroad. 18 
The Court rejected plaintiffs' challenges that the statute should be 
declared void for vagueness because "the prohibition against corporate 
expenditures on a referendum question solely concerning a personal 
[graduated income tax] is both precise and definite."•u The Court re-
fused to consider whether the statute might be impermissibly vague in 
other contexts, since the conduct in question in First National was 
"plainly within its terms. "20 
Once the Supreme Judicial Court decided that corporate first amend-
ment rights derived solely from the property rights of the fourteenth 
amendment, the Court easily disposed of plaintiffs' equal protection 
claim. The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny which would be 
required where free speech itself is involved21 and applied a rational 
basis test-"the traditional scrutiny involving economic matters."22 
Because the Court found that the statute "could represent a legislative 
desire to protect such shareholders against ultra vires activities, "23 the 
Court upheld the statute. 
In First National, the Supreme Judicial Court clearly distinguished 
the first amendment rights afforded corporations from those afforded 
individual citizens. Given this distinction, the Court sustained the legis-
lative judgment that corporate funds may not be used to influence the 
outcome of public questions, except where such questions materially 
" ld. See note 1 supra. 
15 See § 10.1 n.24 supra. 
11 See § 10.1 n.31 supra. 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 152, 359 N.E.2d at 1272. 
11 ld. at 153-54, 359 N.E.2d 1273, quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 
(1973), and United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National ABB'n of Letter Carriers, 413 
u.s. 548, 571 (1973). 
11 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 156, 359 N.E.2d at 1274 (emphasis in original). 
20 ld. at 155, 359 N.E.2d at 1273, quoting United States v. HarriBB, 347 U.S. 612, 618 
(1954). 
11 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 159, 359 N.E.2d at 1275. 
11 ld. at 160, 359 N.E.2d at 1275. 
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affect the property, business or assets of the corporation itself.24 
14 On April 26, 1978, the United States Supreme Court in Fil'llt Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 
_ U.S. _, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S. April 25, 1978), revel'lled -the holding of the 
Supreme Judicial Court. The United States Supreme Court found "no support in the Fil'llt 
or Fourteenth Amendments, or in tlie decisions of this Court, for the proposition that 
speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that 
protection simply because its source is a corporation. . . ." ld. at 4376. 
Once the Supreme Court held that corporations have free speech interests protected by 
the fil'llt amendment, the Court applied its "exacting scrutiny" standard of review to 
determine whether the MB88achusetts statute constituted a permissible encroachment on 
fmt amendment protections. Id. at 4377; see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-62 
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976) (per curiam). In order to survive exact-
ing scrutiny, the challenged practice "must further some vital government end by a means 
that is least restrictive of [fmt amendment] freedoms . . . in achieving that end, and 
the benefit gained must outweigh the 1088 of constitutionally protected rights." Elrod, 427 
U.S. at 363 (footnote omitted). See Note, 18 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 782, 792 (1977). 
While the Supreme Judicial Court did not address the issue because of its view of 
corporate fil'llt amendment interests, see text and notes 11-14 supra, the commonwealth 
advanced two vital state interests before the United States Supreme Court: (1) "the 
State's interest in sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the electoral 
process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen's confidence in government"; (2) 
"the interest in protecting the rights of shareholdel'll whose views differ from those ex-
preBBed by management on behalf of the corporation." 46 U .S.L. W. at 4377. The Supreme 
Court recognized the importance of the state interests, but concluded that neither interest 
was sufficient to outweigh the encroachment on fmt amendment freedoms. Id. at 4377-
79. Thus the Court invalidated the MBBBBchusetts statute. Id. at 4379. 
Justice White, diSBenting in First Nat'l Bank, observed that the majority failed "to 
realize that the state regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment of Fil'llt 
Amendment rights accomplished by the statute must be evaluated are themselves derived 
from the Fil'llt Amendment." I d. at 4381. Justice White agreed that corporate speech is 
protected by the fmt amendment, see id. at 4382, but disagreed with the outcome of the 
balancing proceBB employed by the Court. 
Justice White was most concerned that the majority had drawn an untenable distinc-
tion between the corporate fmt amendment interests and the fmt amendment interests 
of shareholdel'll in the corporation. I d. at 4384-85. He pointed to the 1977 decision in Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and the Court's earlier opinion in International 
ABB'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) for the proposition that an individual 
may not be compelled as a condition of employment to contribute to a political or ideologi-
cal cause which he does not support. Justice White was not pel'lluaded by the majority's 
claim that "the shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to 
withdraw his investment at any time .... " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4379 n.34. As Justice White 
observed, "[t]he employees in Street and Abood were also free to seek other jobs where 
they would not be compelled to fmance causes with which they disagreed, but we held in 
Abood that Fil'llt Amendment rights could not be so burdened." ld. at 4385 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
The Supreme Court's opinion in First Nat'l Bank seems irreconcilable with its opinion 
in Abood. As Justice White put it, after First Nat'l Bank "Massachusetts may not consti-
tutionally prohibit the very evil which Michigan [in Abood] may not constitutionally 
permit." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4384. Whether or not corporations have first amendment rights, 
the Supreme Court's application of the balancing process mandated by its exacting scru-
tiny standard of review has permitted an unfortunate encroachment on the fil'llt amend-
ment rights of individuals. 
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§ 10.4. Abortion Statute: Construction. In 1974, the legislature 
substantially altered the Massachusetts abortion statute• by adopting 
"An Act to Protect Unborn Children and Maternal Health Within Con-
stitutional Limits. "2 Among the sections added to the statute by the 
1974 Act was section 12P, which requires parental or judicial consent 
before a nonemergency abortion is performed on an unmarried minor. 3 
In October, 1974 a pregnant unmarried minor aged 16 years, her phy-
sician and the director of a family planning clinic4 brought an action in 
the federal district court, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of section 
12P. In April, 1975 a three judge district court held the section unconsti-
tutional and ordered the entry of a judgment permanently enjoining the 
Attorney General and the various district attorneys from enforcing sec-
tion 12P. 5 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
district court should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality 
of the statute pending definitive construction of the new statute by the 
Massachusetts courts. • Abstention, the Court held, "might avoid in 
§ 10.4. I G.L. c. 112, §§ 12H-12R. 
• Acts of 1974, c. 706. 
3 G.L. c. 112, § 12P provides: 
(1) If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the 
consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the 
mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge 
of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems neces-
sary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. 
If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the 
remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted their 
family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person having duties similar to a 
guardian, or any person who had a88umed the care and custody of the mother is 
sufficient. 
(2) The commi88ioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such 
consent. Such form shall be signed by the proper person or persons and given to 
the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain it in his permanent files. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as abolishing or limiting any common 
law rights of any other person or persons relative to consent to the performance of 
an abortion for purposes of any civil action or any injunctive relief under section 
twelve R. 
4 For a summary of the plaintiffs and the classes which they represented, see Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 137-38 & nn.7-8 (1976). 
• Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D. Mass. 1975). A majority of the three judge 
district court based its decision on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179 (1973). The majority ruled essentially that§ 12P is not simply a consultation 
statute, but rather that it applies to all unmarried minors with no exception for the 
"mature minor," and that it provides for an absolute, if reasonably made, independent 
veto of the decision by the parents. See Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. at 854-55. For a 
discussion of the decision of the district court, see Berney & Buchbinder, Constitutional 
Law, 1975 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw § 12.6. 
1 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976). 
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whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudica-
tion .... " 7 
Before vacating the judgment of the federal district court, however, 
the Supreme Court addressed the availability of the certified question 
procedure for questions of state law in Massachusetts.8 The Supreme 
Court indicated that the certification procedure substantially alleviates 
the dysfunctional aspects of abstention1 and "the availability of an ade-
quate certification procedure 'does, of course, in the long run save time, 
energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federal-
ism."'10 In fact, the Court remarked that the availability of adequate 
certification procedures for questions of state law actually enhances the 
desirability of abstention. 11 Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment of the district court and remanded the case for certification 
to the Supreme Judicial Court of appropriate questions concerning the 
meaning of section 12P and the procedures it imposes. 12 
7 ld. at 147, quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959). 
8 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976). See MASs. RuLEs oF CouRT, SuP. Jun. 
CT. Rule 3:21. 
' See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) (delay & 
expense); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964) 
(delay, expense & procedural pitfalls). 
10 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976) (footnoted omitted), quoting Lehman 
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). 
11 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976). 
12 ld. at 151-52. On the same day that the United States Supreme Court decided 
Bellotti, it also ruled on the constitutionality of a Missouri abortion statute. Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Missouri statute, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 
559.100 (Vernon 1953), 563.300 (Vernon 1978 Supp.), as amended by 1974 Mo. Laws 809 
(H.B. 1211) (repealed by 1977 Mo. Laws __ , S.B. 60, § 1), also contained a parental 
consent pro~ision which provided in pertinent part that: 
Section 3. No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve 
weeks of pregnancy except: 
(1) By a duly licensed, consenting physician in the exercise of his best clinical 
medical judgment; 
(2) Mter the woman, prior to submitting to the abortion, certifies in writing her 
consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed and freely given and is 
not the result of coercion. 
(3) With the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the abortion is certi-
fied by a licensed physician to be neceBSary in order to preserve the life of the 
mother. 
(4) With the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis ofthe woman 
if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion 
is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the 
mother. 
1974 Mo. Laws 809, 810 (H.B. 1211 §3). 
A divided Court in Danforth held that the parental consent provision in the Missouri 
statute was unconstitutional as a violation of rights enunciated in Wade and Bolton in 
that it gave "a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of 
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With this somewhat unusual procedural background, on August 31, 
1976 the three judge federal district court certified nine questions to the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 13 The Supreme Judicial 
Court provided answers to those nine questions during the Survey year 
in Baird v. Attorney General. 14 
The procedural context of Baird presented an interesting dilemma to 
the Supreme Judicial Court. In effect, the Court was asked to give the 
federal district court a definitive interpretation of a Massachusetts stat-
ute, the constitutional validity of which was challenged. The Court, 
however, was only to interpret the statute; it was not to go on to assess 
the statute's constitutionality. The constitutional questions in the case 
were reserved for the federal courts alone. Thus, if the Supreme Judicial 
Court went about the business of interpreting the statute in the tradi-
tional way, that is, by reviewing the language, intent and history, it ran 
the risk of having it later declared unconstitutional. On the other hand, 
the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardle88 of the 
reason for withholding the consent." 428 U.S. at 74. 
In a concurring opinion in Danforth, Justice Stewart recognized that the Missouri 
statute was constitutionally infirm because it vested an absolute veto of the abortion 
decision in the parents. ld. at 90. Nevertheless, he contrasted the Mi88ouri provision with 
the Ma88achusetts provision, which allows for a judicial resolution of an intrafamilial 
conflict, and implied that the Massachusetts procedure may be valid. Id. at 90-91. 
Two dissenting opinions in Danforth would have upheld the Missouri provision on the 
grounds that the state's interest and the parents' legitimate interest in their unmarried 
minor child would outweigh the child's interest in seeking to terminate her pregnancy. ld. 
at 94-95 .(White, J., dissenting in part), 102-03 (Stevena, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens 
made it explicit that he would apply a rational relationship standard to the statute. See 
id. at 103. In effect, he thus would recognize the state's interest in helping to foster an 
informed decision on the part of the unmarried minor, even though ita means of achieving 
that interest-the requirement of parental consent-may not be a perfect fit. At the least, 
he concluded, it is "surely not irrational." I d. 
In light of the views of the dissenting justices and the implication in the majority 
opinion in Danfoth that not all parental consent statutes are necessarily unconstitutional, 
it is not surprising that the Court remanded the Ma88achusetta statute for clarification. 
13 On remand, the three-judge court dissolved the outstanding injunction and § 12P 
went into effect from July 21, 1976 until July 30, 1976, when enforcement was stayed by 
order of Justice Brennan acting in summer rece88 for the Supreme Court. On October 18, 
1976, the full Supreme Court summarily denied motions to vacate the stay. Bellotti v. 
Baird, 429 U.S. 892 (1976). 
The three judge court solicited proposed questions from all parties before finally arriving 
at the nine questions ultimately certified. 
" 1977 Ma88. Adv. Sh. 96, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977). 
The certified opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court was received by the clerk of the 
federal district court on February 14, 1977. This event automatically di88olved the stay, 
see note 13 supra, entered by Justice Brennan. See Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854, 
857 (1977) (Julian, J., dissenting on the motion to stay). However, the federal district 
court granted ita own stay, effective February 10, 1977, pending ita determination of the 
constitutionality of§ 12P as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court. Baird v. Bellotti, 
428 F. Supp. at 855. 
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if the Court interpreted the statute in an anticipatory way, that is inter-
peting it in a strained fashion in an attempt to save its constitutionality, 
perhaps it would be upheld in a subsequent federal court proceeding. 
The Court chose the latter approach and as a result the opinion is 
replete with uncertainties and ambiguities. 15 
In essence, the certified questions solicited the Supreme Judicial 
Court's opinion as to: (1) the statutory standard for parental consent; 
(2) the statutory standard for a judicial order granting consent; (3) 
parental consultation as a statutory requirement; (4) parental notifica-
tion; (5) procedures for expeditious decision; (6) the relationship of sec-
tions 12P and 12F; (7) appointment of counsel for an indigent minor; 
(8) the physician's reasonable and good faith belief as a defense; and (9) 
other comments. 18 
The Court began its discussion of the nine questions with the general 
proposition that: "Our principal advice to the Federal District Court is 
that we would construe § 12P to preserve as much of the expressed 
legislative purpose as is Constitutionally permissible."17 Then the Court 
proceeded to answer the individual questions. 
Responding to the first two questions, which inquired into the statu-
tory standards for parental and judicial consent, 18 the Court determined 
that the standard of section 12P requires that the parents and court 
11 The attempt to save the statute apparently was unsuccessful. On May 3, 1978 the 
federal district court again declared the statute unconstitutional. Baird v. Bellotti,-
F. Supp. _ (1978). See note 51 infra. 
11 The complete form of the question certified to the Court may be found in the foot-
notes to the Court's opinion in Baird. See generally 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 96, 360 N.E.2d 
288. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 100, 360 N.E.2d at 292. 
18 1. What standards, if any, does the statute establish for a parent to apply when 
considering whether or not to grant consent? 
a) Is the parent to consider "exclusively ... what will serve the child's best 
interest"?* (*Appellants' Brief before the Supreme Court, p. 23. But cf. Baird v. 
Bellotti, D. Mass., 1975, 393 F. Supp. 847, at 855). 
b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minor's best interests, 
can the parent take into consideration the "long-term consequences to the family 
and her parents' marriage relationship"?* (*Defendants' Brief in this Court, p. 16). 
c) Other? 
ld. at 102 n.4, 360 N.E.2d at 292 n.4. 
2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply? 
a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are not based 
exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests? 
b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in fact, made 
and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the 
court refuse its consent based on a finding that a parent's or its own, contrary 
decision is a better one? 
c) Other? 
ld. at 103 n.5, 360 N.E.2d at 293 n.5. 
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consider "exclusively ... what will serve the child's best interests."•• 
The Court construed the statute in this fashion, even though no stan-
dard was explicitly mentioned in the statute, 20 because it believed that 
constitutional constraints enunciated by the Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth21 required such an interpretation. 
In answer to question three, involving prior parental consultation, 22 
the Court believed the legislative intent too obvious to permit any inter-
pretation other than the absolute necessity of prior parental consulta-
tion except in the case of emergencies requiring immediate action or 
where no parent or statutory substitute is available. 23 The Court thereby 
rejected an argument made by the Attorney General in an attempt to 
bolster the constitutionality of the section, to the effect that the 
"mature minor" rule would apply, thereby abrogating the need for prior 
parental consultation in certain instances.24 
The Court was of the opinion that the legislature made it categorically 
clear that prior parental consultation was necessary without any excep-
tion for the mature minor rule. It is interesting to note that in discussing 
this issue, however, the Court by way of dicta reached the conclusion 
that "apart from statutory limitations which are constitutional, where 
the best interests of a minor will be served by not notifying his or her 
parents of intended medical treatment and where the minor is capable 
of giving informed consent to that treatment, the mature minor rule 
applies in this Commonwealth. " 25 Thus, the Court for the first time 
explicitly recognized the mature minor rule even though the rule does 
not apply to section 12P. 
Since the Court had concluded that prior parental consultation was 
required by section 12P, it followed that question four, concerning par-
" Id. at 102, 360 N.E.2d at 292. 
" Section 12P has no discernible legislative history and provides simply that "the 
consent of both ... parents is required." For the text of§ 12P, see note 3 supra. 
21 See note 12 supra. 
22 "3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving informed 
consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informal consent,' 'to obtain [a court] order without 
parental consultation'?* (*See Supreme Court [opinion, 428 U.S. p. 145 ... ])" 1977 
MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 105 n.6, 360 N.E.2d at 293 n.6. 
23 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 106, 360 N.E.2d at 294. 
24 The so-called mature minor rule has never been explicitly adopted in Massachusetts 
either by statute or judicial decision. But see G.L. c. 112 § 12F. See text and note 32 infra. 
The mature minor rule developed as an exception to the requirement of parental consent 
prior to an operation. The unemancipated but mature minor was capable of consenting 
to an operation even though there was no medical emergency and even though one or both 
parents were available for consultation. The rule calls for an analysis of the nature of the 
operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the particular minor to understand fully 
what the medical procedure involves. 
211 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 111, 360 N.E.2d at 296 (emphasis added). 
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ental notification, 28 had to be answered that parental notification was 
required. 27 The Court responded to question five28 by determining that 
a speedy disposition of a section 12P proceeding is essential so as not to 
unduly burden the minor's constitutional right to an abortion and indi-
cating that it would become directly involved, if necessary, to assure a 
speedy section 12P proceeding.28 Moreover, the Court observed that its 
appeal procedure was sufficiently prompt and dispositive, citing its 1974 
decision in Doe v. Doe30 to demonstrate that, where necessary, an appeal 
in an abortion case could be processed quickly.31 
The sixth question certified to the Supreme Judicial Court necessi-
tated a comparison between section 12P and section 12F of the statute. 32 
21 "4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the superior court, 
for good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notifica-
tion to the parents, and (b), without subsequent notification?" ld. at 112 n.10, 360 N.E.2d 
at 297 n.10. 
27 Id. at 113, 360 N.E.2d at 297. 
21 "5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to implement c. 
112, § 12P which will expedite the application, hearing, and decision phases ofthe superior 
court proceeding provided thereunder? Appeal?" ld. at 113 n.11, 360 N.E.2d at 297 n.11. 
21 ld. at 113, 360 N.E.2d at 297. 
30 365 Mass. 556, 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974). 
31 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 115, 360 N.E.2d at 298 (noting that in Doe the Court entered 
a dispositive order within 48 hours after the case was reported for decision). 
32 G.L. c. 112, § 12F, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 564, was enacted after the decision 
of the district court in Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), and before the 
decision of the Supreme Court remanding case to the district court. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 
u.s. 132, 151-52 (1976). 
Section 12F permits certain categories of minors to obtain medical treatment without 
parental consent with a proviso excluding abortion and sterilization procedures. 
Section 12F provides in pertinent part: 
Any minor may give consent to his medical or dental care at the time such care 
is sought if (i) he is married, widowed, divorced; or (ii) he is the parent of a 
child ... ; or (iii) he is a member of any of the armed forces; or (iv) she is pregnant 
or believes herself to be pregnant; or (v) he is living separate and apart from his 
parent of legal guardian, and is managing his own financial affairs; or (vi) he 
reasonably believes himself to be suffering from or to have come in contact with 
any disease defined as dangerous to the public health pursuant to section six of 
chapter one hundred and eleven; provided, however, that such minor may only 
consent to care which relates to the diagnosis or treatment of such disease. 
Consent shall not be granted under subparagraphs (ii) through (vi), inclusive, for 
abortions or sterilization. 
In argument before the Supreme Court, plaintiffs "pointed to the new provisions of § 
12F and argued that § 12F heightened the discrimination between unmarried minors 
seeking abortions and minors seeking other medical procedures." Baird v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 118, 360 N.E.2d at 299. The Supreme Court declined to 
consider this argument until the Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to define 
"the nature of the consent required for abortions." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150 
(1976). The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that "it would not be 
inappropriate for the District Court ... to certify a question [to the Supreme Judicial 
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In response, the Court characterized section 12F as the adoption of a 
limited statutory mature minor rule.33 Those minors who are "married, 
widowed, or divorced" need no parental or judicial approval for any 
medical procedure, including abortions. 34 
In addition, the Court noted that the standard to be applied in both 
section 12F and section 12P cases was that of the best interests of the 
minor.35 In section 12F procedures, the physician must exercise his med-
ical judgment and the minor must consent, both agreeing that the medi-
cal procedure is in the minor's best interest.31 In section 12P cases, once 
the physician exercises his medical judgment, the statute requires con-
sent of the minor and consultation with the parents or a court order that 
the abortion is in the best interests of the minor. 37 
Responding to question seven, 38 the Court held that if the trial judge, 
in his discretion, concludes that the best interests of the minor would 
be served by the appointment of counsel, the judge may appoint such 
counsel or a guardian ad litem for the indigent minor, at public ex-
pense.3' The Court rested this conclusion both upon the positive impli-
cation of section 12P and upon specific statutory authority granting a 
superior court judge the power to appoint counsel to protect the interests 
of a minor. 40 
The eighth question certified to the Court addressed the physician's 
good faith defense against charges of violation of the statute.41 The Court 
interpreted section 12F as extending its protections to physicians per-
forming abortions. Section 12F provides that a "physician who believes, 
Court) concerning the meaning of the new statute, and the extent to which its procedures 
differ from the procedures that must be followed under § 12P." ld. at 151-52. 
33 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 117, 360 N.E.2d at 299. 
" ld. at 119, 360 N.E.2d at 300. 
,. Id. 
,. Id. 
37 Id. 
The court declined to rule on whether the procedural differences between section 12P 
and section 12F violated the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion. However, the Court noted that the standard for determining possible equal protec-
tion violations under the MaBSachusetts Constitution is "substantially the same" as the 
standard for determining possible equal protection violations under the United States 
Constitution. Id. at 120, 360 N.E.2d at 300. Therefore, the Court addressed equal protec-
tion concerns in response to the ninth certified question. See text and notes 45-48 infra. 
30 "7. May a minor, upon a showing ofindigency, have court-appointed counsel?" 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 120 n.17, 360 N.E.2d at 301 n.17. 
31 ld. at 122, 360 N.E.2d at 301. 
41 Id. at 119 & n.18, 360 N.E.2d at 301 & n.18; see, e.g., MAss. R. CIV. P. 17(b). 
" "8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician peforms an abortion 
solely with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably, and in good faith, though 
erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or more years old or had been married?" 1977 
MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 123 n.21, 360 N.E.2d at 302 n.21. The Court remarked that the use of 
the term "'valid' may not be an appropriate one in the context of the question." ld. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/13
§10.4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 
reasonably and in good faith, that a minor is eighteen or more years old 
or has been married, divorced or widowed, although it is not a fact, "42 
shall not be liable, civilly or criminally, for failing to obtain the consent 
of the parent or legal guardian of the minor. Since section 12F does not 
explicitly except abortions from its coverage, the Court, in order to avoid 
a constitutional problem, ruled that its protections do extend to physi-
cians performing abortions. 43 
In response to the final question certified, 44 the Court expressed its 
opinion concerning the effect that a ruling holding the differing proce-
dures in section 12P and section 12F unconstitutional would have on 
those two sections.45 The Court suggested two alternatives: (1) section 
12F might be construed as applying to all operations, including abor-
tions, in which case section 12P would be repealed; or (2) section 12F 
as it applies to pregnant minors might be interpreted as extending only 
to medical procedures associated with a determination of pregnancy and 
abortion counseling rather than to all medical procedures. 46 The Su-
preme Judicial Court was of the opinion that the second alternative 
should be adopted.47 However, if the proposed interpretation would be 
unconstitutional because it distinguishes between pregnancy-related 
operations and all other operations, then the Court was of the opinion 
that section 12P must fail because the Court saw "in § 12F a general 
legislative intent to eliminate any necessity for parental or judicial con-
sent to operations on minors in the circumstances described in§ 12F."4K 
The Supreme Judicial Court thus labored to construe the Massachu-
setts abortion statute in a manner designed to save the statute. None-
theless, in light of the Danforth limitations," it seems unlikely that the 
Massachusetts statute, with its mandatory parental consultation provi-
sions, 110 can withstand constitutional attack. 51 
'
2 Id. at 123, 360 N.E.2d at 302. 
42 ld. 
" "9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which, in its opin-
ion, might assist us in determining whether it infringes the United States Constitution?" 
Id. at 123 n.22, 360 N.E.2d at 302 n.22. 
41 Section 12F allows a pregnant minor to consent to any medical procedure except 
abortion or sterilization, while f 12P requires parental or judicial consent before a preg-
nant minor can consent to an abortion. See text and notes 32-37 supra. 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 125, 360 N.E.2d at 303 . 
.. ld. 
•• I d. at 125-26, 360 N .E.2d at 303. 
" See note 12 supra. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 126, 360 N.E.2d at 303. 
It appears conceivable that some type of parental consent or parental consultation 
statute could survive constitutional attack. Cf., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 793 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (statute unconstitutional, since it permits parents to prohibit daughter's abor-
tion "for reasons other than the minor's best interests"), afl'd mem., 428 U.S. 901 (1976); 
Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D. Colo. 1975) (Colorado "blanket requirement" 
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§ 10.5. Abortion: Commonwealth v. Edelin. During the Survey 
year, the Supreme Judicial Court also rendered an opinion addressing 
the abortion issue in Commonwealth v. Edelin, 1 a case deserving of 
comment because it attracted national attention. 2 Because of the unique 
circumstances of the case, however, the decision has limited preceden-
tial value for constitutional decisionmaking. 3 
of parental consent unconstitutional); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 909, 530 P.2d 
260, 266 (1975) (parental consultation, but not consent, requirement may survive constitu-
tional attack). Moreover, it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court would have 
withheld final judgment if no form of parental consultation statute could have survived. 
•• The Massachusetts statute did not survive. See Baird v. Bellotti, No. 74-4992-F (D. 
Mass. May 2, 1978). The federal district court invalidated the statute, finding "that there 
could be no parents' bypass in any case ... [and] that the, statute eliminated abortions 
altogether from the mature minor rule." ld., slip op. at 5. 
Ironically, the district court criticized the Supreme Judicial Court's attempt to save the 
statute. "The Massachusetts court . . . purported to give it a chameleon-like ability to 
adjust to whatever color should ultimately be necessary to protect it." Id., slip op. at 16. 
The court seemed somewhat amused by the efforts of the Supreme Judicial Court: 
[T]he court seems to have found the ultimate remedy for all constitutional infirmi-
ties. If a statute which, in terms, requires parental consultation without exception, 
can "be construed to require as much parental consultation as is permissible consti-
tutionally," here, at once, is an instant cure, both for overbreadth, and for lack of 
standards. Regardless of whether a statute says too much, or too little, so long as 
the legislature intended it to be constitutional, when it comes before a court it will 
be appropriately rewritten. With due respect, we cannot believe this to be possible. 
ld., slip op. at 18. 
Dissenting in Baird, Judge Julian would have upheld the statute except insofar as it 
allowed a superior court judge to refuse an abortion request to a "minor . . . 'capable of 
making and [who] has made an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion"' 
on his own determination of the best interests of the minor. ld., slip op. at 2 (Julian, J., 
dissenting). Judge Julian was convinced that the Massachusetts statute was a legitimate 
attempt by the state to protect its minor residents "from undue outside influences and 
hasty, unreasoned decisions on abortions." Id., slip op. at 28 (Julian, J., dissenting). 
§ 10.5 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2795, 359 N.E.2d 4. 
2 See, e.g., New York Times, Feb. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 3; Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1975, at 
1, col. 3. 
3 The facts and the setting of Edelin were unique and are unlikely to recur. The case 
arose in Massachusetts during a period after the United States Supreme Court decided 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), striking on 
constitutional grounds the abortion statutes in all states, including G.L. c. 272, § 19, and 
before the Massachusetts legislature could formulate an abortion statute that would sat-
isfy the Wade-Bolton standards. The unusual circumstances of the case prompted Justice 
Kaplan to state in the prevailing opinion (agreed to in its entirety by only Justices 
Braucher and Wilkins) that: 
We are conscious that the significance of our decision as precedent is still further 
reduced by the fact that the case arose in an interregnum between the Supreme 
Court's abortion decisions of 1973 and the adoption of legislation intended to con-
form to those decisions-a kind of interval not likely to be repeated. 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2823, 359 N.E.2d at 18. 
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In September of 1973 a patient entered Boston City Hospital and 
requested an abortion. The Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology inter-
viewed and examined the patient and concluded that the gestational age 
of the fetus was twenty weeks.• Based on the estimates of the gestational 
age, the physician decided to abort by the saline method.6 Dr. Kenneth 
Edelin, Chief Resident of the obstetric service, was the surgeon assigned 
to carry out the procedure. After an unsuccessful attempt to induce the 
The precedential value of Edelin is further reduced by the wide split among the six 
justices who heard the appeal: 
All six Justices who heard the appeal, holding that there was error in the proceed-
ings at trial, vote to reverse the conviction. Five Justices also vote to direct the entry 
of a judgment of acquittal; the Chief Justice, dissenting in part in a separate 
opinion, would order a new trial. The five Justices are agreed that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to go to a jury on the overarching issue whether Dr. Edelin was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the "wanton" or "reckless" conduct resulting in a 
death required for a conviction herein, and that motions for a directed verdict of 
acquittal should have been granted accordingly. Three of the five Justices would 
reach the same result of reversal and acquittal on each of the additional, indepen-
dent grounds (a) that there was insufficient evidence to go to a jury of a live birth, 
an indispensable element for conviction of manslaughter, (b) that there was preju-
dicial divergence between the accusation against Dr. Edelin and the instructions 
to the jury. The two other Justices in a separate opinion explain their concurrence 
on the issue of wanton or reckless conduct; they decline to accept ground (a) or (b). 
ld. at 2795-96, 359 N.E.2d at 5 (footnotes omitted). 
The Supreme Court in Wade and Bolton effectively held that a woman has a constitu-
tional right of privacy encompassing a right to terminate a pregnancy without state inter-
vention. Specifically, the woman's right to privacy precludes any state intervention rela-
tive to an abortion decision arrived at between the woman and her physician at the state 
prior to approximately the end of the first trimester of the pregnancy term. Wade, 410 
U.S. at 152-54. Because of the state's interest in protecting maternal health, the state may 
regulate the abortion procedure during the stage from the end of the first trimester. 
Moreover, because of the state's interest in both the health of the mother and the poten-
tiality of human life, the state may regulate abortions for the stage of the pregnancy 
subsequent to "viability" of the fetus. ld. at 164-165. 
While the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of when "viability" occurs, the Court 
nevertheless stated, "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but 
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." ld. at 160 (footnote omitted). The Court further 
indicated that at "viability" the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's 
womb, albeit with artificial aid," and "presumably has the capability of meaningful life 
outside the mother's womb." ld. at 160, 163 (footnote omitted). 
In August, 1974, the Massachusetts legislature ultimately enacted legislation consistent 
with the Wade and Bolton guidelines. See G.L. c. 112, §§ 12H-12R. The facts ofthe Edelin 
case, however, occurred prior to the enactment of the new statutory scheme. 
• The patient was subsequently examined by two other physicians, including Dr. Ede-
lin, and a medical student. They estimated gestational age variously between twenty and 
twenty-four weeks. Edelin, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2798-99, 359 N.E.2d at 6-7. 
1 The saline method is a commonly accepted medical procedure for aborting a preg-
nancy during the second trimester. The procedure involves "inducing fetal death and a 
miscarriage by introducing a salt solution into the amniotic sac containing the fetus." ld. 
at 2799, 359 N.E.2d at 7. 
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abortion utilizing the saline method, Dr. Edelin consulted with his de-
partment supervisor and then aborted the pregnancy by utilizing a pro-
cedure termed "hysterotomy. "1 
On April 11, 1974 a grand jury returned an indictment against Dr. 
Edelin, alleging that he killed "a male child . . . by . . . assault and 
beating."7 At trial, the commonwealth theorized that the fetus became 
a "person" for purposes of the manslaughter statute at the time the 
placenta was detached from the uterine wall.8 At that time, the com-
monwealth argued, the fetus was killed by a wanton and reckless act by 
Dr. Edelin.• 
The defense contended that for the manslaughter statute to apply a 
fetus must be "hom alive" completely outside the mother's body. In 
addition, any homicidal acts must be committed after the fetus is "hom 
alive," not before.•• 
After a lengthy trial where hosts of prosecution and defense witnesses 
gave testimony on such issues as viability, gestational age, respirational 
activity and actual life, a jury returned a verdict of guilty against Dr. 
Edelin.11 On appeal, five of the six justices hearing the case agreed that 
"there was insufficient evidence to go to a jury on the overarching issue 
whether Dr. Edelin was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
'wanton' or 'reckless' conduct resulting in a death required for a convic-
tion."12 
To reach this result, the Court assumed that there was sufficient 
• Hysterotomy is a procedure whereby an incision is made through the abdominal wall 
and into the uterus. The surgeon then sweeps the uterine cavity with his fingers in order 
to detach the placenta from the uterine wall so that the amniotic sac can be removed 
through the incision. I d. at 2800, 359 N .E.2d at 7. 
7 ld. at 2805, 359 N.E.2d at 9. Dr. Edelin was charged with violation of the Massachu-
setts manslaughter statute. G.L. c. 265, f 13. 
1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2806, 359 N.E.2d at 10 . 
• ld. 
During the performance of the abortion by hysterotomy, Dr. Edelin, "after he manually 
separated the placenta from the uterine wall and before he removed [the fetus] from the 
abdominal cavity," waited for a period of from three to five minutes. ld. It was this wait 
which the prosecution characterized as the act for the charge of manslaughter. 
The prosecution offered testimony on this issue to the effect that while Dr. Edelin was 
performing this procedure he remained motionless for at least three minutes with his eyes 
fixed on a clock in the operating room. 
Dr. Edelin responded in testimony at trial that after he had detached the placenta from 
the uterine wall and began to remove the amniotic sac through the incision, the sac 
ruptured. He then attempted to take hold of a lower extremity of the fetus in order to draw 
the fetus through the incision, a procedure that would explain the three to five minute 
delay. ld. at 2801, 359 N .E.2d at 7. 
11 I d. at 2806, 359 N .E.2d at 10. 
11 ld. at 2808, 359 N.E.2d at 11. 
11 Id. at 2795-96, 359 N.E.2d at 5. 
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evidence to allow the jury to find a "live" birth and subsequent death 
of the fetus. The Court also interpreted the trial judge's instructions as 
meaning that only Dr. Edelin's conduct during the postnatal stage of the 
abortion13 could be considered for conviction of manslaughter.•• Given 
the facts in Edelin, the Court concluded that there was no significant 
evidence to establish or even to permit submission to the jury of the 
question whether Dr. Edelin had engaged in wanton or reckless conduct 
after the birth of the fetus. 15 
However, the commonwealth also contended that Dr. Edelin's con-
duct during the prenatal stage of the abortion could be considered on 
the issue of recklessness and the trial judge's instructions should be read 
to allow this consideration.•• The Court indicated that there were three 
reasons why the commonwealth's contention was unacceptable and in 
any event would not change the result. First, the Court was in doubt as 
to whether the manslaughter statute spoke to prenatal conduct. 17 Sec-
11 Upon removal of the fetus from the uterus, to all appearances the fetus was dead. It 
evinced no signs of breathing or life. Nonetheless, Dr. Edelin placed his hand on the fetal 
chest to check for a heartbeat and found no additional signs of life. See id. at 2809, 359 
N.E.2d at 11. 
1
' The instructions of the trial judge were of particular significance in the case. He 
recognized that the manslaughter charge in the case was "inextricably intertwined" with 
the Supreme Court's Wade-Bolton abortion decisions. Except in the limited situations 
where the state could constitutionally regulate abortions, the decision must be left to the 
woman and her physician. Thus, a physician is constitutionally protected in performing 
an abortion during the entire nine months of the patient's pregnancy unless the state has 
acted to promote either its interest in the health of the mother or its interest in the 
potentiality of human life. ld. at 2807-08, 359 N.E.2d at 10-11. 
On the question whether the fetus was "born alive," the judge instructed the jury that 
"birth" was "the process which causes the emergence of a new individual from the body 
of its mother." ld. at 2807, 359 N.E.2d at 10. However, the judge did not discuss the 
meaning of "alive." In addition, the judge did not instruct the jury on the importance of 
determining the "viability" of the fetus. He "left it to the jury in their 'consideration of 
the facts' ... to 'determine' whether viability had 'any applicability.'" ld. at 2808, 359 
N.E.2d at 11. 
15 Id. at 2795-96, 359 N.E.2d at 5. 
11 Id. at 2810, 359 N.E.2d at 11-12. 
17 The Court concluded that it is well understood that manslaughter assumes a live and 
independent person as the victim. Destruction of a fetus in utero at common law was not 
manslaughter but rather abortion or perhaps feticide. Recognizing that there was some 
conflict at common law as to whether a defendant could be tried for manslaughter for 
injuring a fetus in utero when subsequently that fetus is born alive and then dies from 
the pre-inflicted injury, the Court concluded on the basis of dicta in an early Massachu-
setts opinion of Justice Holmes that the Commonwealth prefers the view that prenatal 
acts can not be grounds for manslaughter despite a later live birth and death. ld. at 2811, 
359 N.E.2d at 12. See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15, 17 (1884) (Holmes, J.). 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Hennessey disputes this conclusion. While recognizing that 
there is no case in Massachusetts on point, on the basis of decisions in other jurisdictions 
and English common law he concludes that "conduct toward a subject prenatally may 
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ond, even if the manslaughter statute were interpreted to include con-
sideration of prenatal conduct such an interpretation would be unconsti-
tutional following the Wade-Bolton decisions.18 Third, even if Dr. Ede-
lin's conduct in the prenatal stage of the procedure could be considered 
for purposes of the manslaughter statute, nevertheless, there was still 
no evidence of his recklessness that would require submission to a jury .19 
Speaking only for themselves, Justices Braucher, Kaplan and Wilkins 
believed that there was insufficient evidence of live birth in the instant 
case and thus that issue should not have gone to the jury. These three 
justices believed that the trial judge correctly charged the jury that 
"there could be no subject of manslaughter unless and until the fetus 
was live born."• 
The only evidence of postnatal life presented at the trial was testi-
mony elicited from a pathologist who had conducted a microscopic ex-
amination of the fetus' lung tissue and concluded that there was some 
"breathing" outside the uterus. 21 The three justices assumed that the 
give rise to criminal liability if it results in the death of the child after its live birth." 1976 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2841, 359 N.E.2d at 25, citing, e.g., Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 
256 S.W. 433 (1923); Abram v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 273, 278 (Cole's ed. 1856). 
•• Edelin, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2811-12, 359 N.E.2d at 12-13. See note 3 supra. 
Justices Reardon and Quirico as well as Chief Justice Hennessey were at variance with 
the majority on this issue. It was their opinion that viability is the key factor, since they 
felt that Wade-Bolton held that the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human 
life may outweigh the woman's interest in abortion at the stage of the pregnancy subse-
quent to the "viability" of the fetus. Thus, any constitutional protection afforded a physi-
cian extends only to that stage of the pregnancy preceding viability. ld. at 2829, 359 
N.E.2d at 20 (Reardon, J., dissenting in part). Justices Reardon and Quirico were of the 
opinion that there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that the fetus in the instant 
case was viable; thus the jury could constitutionally consider the post viability prenatal 
conduct along with the postnatal conduct of the physician to determine whether he was 
wanton and reckless. I d. at 2830, 359 N .E.2d at 20-21. 
The majority did not necessarily disagree with the reasoning of the dissenters, but 
believed that state reg\Ilation of abortions after viability had to be expressed in "tailored" 
legislation specifically establishing guidelines and procedures. Since the manslaughter 
statute is "flat and contains no such detail," the majority was of the opinion that it would 
be unconstitutional to attempt to tailor it to bear on a "physician as he went about the 
predelivery process of performing an abortion." Id. at 2811-12, 359 N.E.2d at 12. The 
majority further believed that even if the manslaughter statute could be read to imple-
ment the state's interest in the potentialty of human life after viability, nevertheless, it 
would have been necessary for the judge to have instructed the jury as to how the man-
slaughter statute should be applied consistent with Wade-Bolton. This would have re-
quired at a minimum an instruction as to the definition of "viability" which was omitted 
from his charge. ld. at 2812, 359 N.E.2d at 12. 
11 /d. at 2814, 359 N.E.2d at 14. 
21 Id. at 2816, 359 N.E.2d at 15. 
21 The medical examiner also examined lung tissue of the fetus and found that there 
was "partial expansion of some of the alveoli." This suggested some respiratory activity 
but left the question where it had taken place. Three possibilities existed on this question. 
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evidence therefore was sufficient to entitle a jury to conclude that some 
breathing occurred after delivery of the fetus. However, the question 
still remained as to whether it was sufficient to establish postnatal life. 22 
The defense had proposed that the judge instruct the jury according to 
the definition of "live-born infant" formulated and published by the 
Committee on Terminology of the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists. 23 The justices were of the opinion that this definition 
was less exacting of proof and thus more favorable to the commonwealth 
than any standard applied in manslaughter cases throughout the coun-
try.24 Even if the jury had applied this standard, based upon the facts 
of the instant case, it could not have concluded that the fetus was "born 
alive." Thus, the three justices believed that the commonwealth had 
failed in its proof on this issue and acquittal was necessary. 
Justices Reardon and Quirico disagreed with the three justices on the 
issue of live birth. They were of the opinion that the trial judge's instruc-
tions were explicit enough so that: 
[N]o jury under any plain understanding of the English language 
could conclude that the conviction of the defendant could occur 
unless there had been a live birth of a child outside the body of 
the mother and that subsequently there were wanton or reckless 
acts of the defendant, which acts caused the death of that child.25 
Justices Braucher, Kaplan and Wilkins further believed that acquit-
tal was necessary in this case because of a prejudicial shift from the 
accusation as specified by the commonwealth to the crime as defined 
in the trial judge's instructions.28 The indictment of defendant as parti-
Either "the fetus had sucked amniotic fluid," or had taken in room air through the uterine 
incision, or had done so after delivery clear of the uterus. I d. at 2817 & n. 34, 359 N .E.2d 
15 & n.34. 
22 Since the trial judge did not instruct the jury as to what legal standard they should 
apply to determine "hom alive," the three Justices could have concluded that a new trial 
with appropriate instructions on this issue was necessary. However, they went further and 
considered the evidence to see whether it would have satisfied any acceptable standard 
of "hom alive." Finding the evidence did not satisfy any standard, the three Justices 
believed an acquittal necessary and not mere reversal with a new trial. Id. at 2818, 359 
N.E. 2d at 15. 
23 "Liveborn infant is a fetus, irrespective of its gestational age, that after complete 
expulsion or extraction from the mother, shows evidence of life-that is, heartbeats or 
respirations. Heartbeats are to be distinguished from several transient cardiac contrac-
tions; respirations are to be distinguished from fleeting respiratory efforts or gasps." Id. 
at 2818, 359 N.E.2d at 16, quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, 
COMMriTEE ON TERMINOLOGY, 0BSTETRIC-BYNECOLOGIC TERMINOLOGY 454 (Hughes ed. 1972). 
u The standard simply required some minimal demonstration of independent existence 
beyond "fleeting respiratory efforts or gasps." 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2817, 359 N.E.2d 
at 16. 
21 Id. at 2827, 359 N.E.2d at 19 (emphasis in original). 
21 According to the three justices: 
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cularized by the commonwealth asserted that the fetus died either while 
it was in utero or when it was partially removed.27 However, the trial 
judge's instructions indicated that conviction depended upon a live 
birth after delivery free of the mother. Also, the indictment as particu-
larized asserted that the criminal conduct of defendant was the three 
to five minute pause while the fetus was in utero.28 However, the instruc-
tions confined the jury's consideration to the postnatal conduct of the 
defendant. The three justices were of the opinion that if the common-
wealth had offered proof as to the elements of the criminal offense as 
particularized there could not be a conviction because the trial judge's 
instruction essentially placed different elements before the jury for con-
sideration. Therefore, "conviction must be taken to have rested on ele-
ments forming no part of the accusation as particularized. "29 
Justices Reardon and Quirico also disagreed with the others on the 
question of variance. In their opinion, the defendant was not prejudiced 
by the variance between allegations and proof. 30 To support this conclu-
sion the justices cited numerous situations both before and during the 
course of the trial where the commonwealth made it known to the defen-
dant that it: 
[W]as not proceeding against him criminally on any theory that 
his action in performing an effective abortion per se constituted the 
crime of manslaughter. Rather he knew, or should have known, 
from those statements that his prosecution was based on the al-
leged premise that, although he had undertaken and intended to 
perform an effective abortion, his efforts had instead resulted in an 
unintended and perhaps unexpected, birth of a child, and that he 
had caused the death of the child by his subsequent wanton or 
reckless conduct. 31 
Perhaps the more far-reaching ramification of the Edelin case is the 
practical effect it will have on physicians performing abortions in the 
The policy of the statute of "variance," G.L. c. 277, § 35, tends to support acquittal 
in the present case. It says that a defendant "shall not be acquitted on the ground 
of variance between the allegations and (the) proof," but this is conditioned on the 
"essential elements of the crime" being "correctly stated." That was not the case 
here. The statute indicates, further, that even when the condition is met, acquittal 
is called for where the defendant was "thereby prejudiced [i.e., by the variance] 
in his defense." 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2820, 359 N.E.2d at 17 (footnoted omitted). 
17 I d. at 2819, 359 N .E.2d at 16. 
21 Id. 
• "The offense must not only be proved as charged, but it must be charged as proved." 
ld. at 2820, 359 N.E.2d at 16, quoting, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blood, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 
31, 33 (1855). 
11 I d. at 2831, 359 N .E.2d at 21. 
11 ld. at 2832-33, 359 N.E.2d at 22. 
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future. While Justice Kaplan in his opinion for the Court expressed the 
view that even though physicians are accountable criminally for their 
conduct, nevertheless, due regard should be afforded the "unavoidable 
difficulties and dubieties of many professional judgments. "32 
Shortly after the Edelin decision, the medical community focused 
discussion on the difficulty of finding gestational age accurately, and the 
increasingly difficult medico-legal questions of viability in a field where 
technical advance, now can sustain younger and smaller fetuses to inde-
pendent life. Practically speaking, doctors are likely to become more 
reluctant, after Edelin, to perform abortions after the twentieth week of 
the pregnancy. 
The Massachusetts abortion statute, which did not govern the Edelin 
facts but which currently regulates abortions in Massachusetts, sets out 
procedures and states judgments which a physician must make before 
performing an abortion on a woman beginning her twenty-fourth week 
of pregnancy.33 This statute, in conjunction with the Edelin decision, 
seems certain to have a "chilling effect" on the performance of abortions 
in the hazy 20-24 week gestational period. 
§ 10.6 Omitted Child Statute: Equal Protection. Since 1968, the 
United States Supreme Court has on twelve occasions considered the 
constitutionality of statutes allegedly discriminating on the basis of 
illegitimacy.' These cases consistently present challenges based on the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. While it is not entirely clear from previous Su-
preme Court opinions whether classifications based on illegitimacy are 
"suspect," requiring that any justifications must survive "strict scru-
tiny" under equal protection analysis, it is clear that the scrutiny af-
forded is not to be "a toothless one."2 Thus, it seems clear from the 
u ld. at 2824, 359 N.E.2d at 18 (footnoted omitted). The effect of Justice Kaplan's 
statement is somewhat reduced by the comment made by Chief Justice Henneaaey, dia-
aenting in Edelin: "I trust that no language in any of the three opinions in this caae will 
be construed ao as to overstate the constitutional protections against criminal proaecution 
afforded doctors charged with crimea arising out of abortions." Id. at 2849, 359 N .E.2d at 
28. 
u G.L. c. 112 §§ 12H-12R, added by c. 706 of the Acts of 1976. 
§ 10.6 • Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 
(1976); Weinberger v. Beaty, 418 U.S. 901 (1974) (Mem.), aff'g 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 
1973); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Richardson v. 
Griffm, 409 U.S. 1069 (Mem.), aff'g 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972); Richardson v. Davis, 
409 U.S. 1069 (Mem.), aff'g 342 F.Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972); Weber v. Aetna Caa. & Sur. 
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American 
Guarantee & Liab. Ina. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
2 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). 
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Supreme Court opinions that when a classification is based on illegiti-
macy the Court will not defer completely to the articulated legislative 
purpose justifying the classification, but rather will analyze the relation 
of the purpose to the means by which it chooses to carry out that pur-
pose. 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon 
to decide whether the Massachusetts omitted child statute, 3 interpreted 
as having no application to illegitimate children not legitimated, 4 was 
constitutional. In Hanson v. Markham, 5 applying what can best be 
termed a "toothless"• scrutiny, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the statute. 
In Hanson, the decedent left a will naming his wife, daughter and two· 
other individuals as legatees. However, the decedent failed to provide 
in his will for the plaintiff, his illegitimate daughter. Plaintiff filed a 
complaint alleging that she was the decedent's daughter7 and that "the 
omission of her name (in his will) was unintentional and occasioned by 
accident and mistake."• The trial judge granted the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff was not a lawful 
heir.' The plaintiff appealed, grounding her claims in the theory that the 
omitted child statute was violative of the equal protection clause of the 
United States Constitution.•• 
The Supreme Judicial Court11 summarily dismissed the plaintiff's 
1 G.L. c. 191, § 20, amended by Acts of 1969, c. 479, § 2, provides in pertinent part: 
H a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, whether born before 
or after the testator's death, or for the issue of a deceased child, whether born before 
or after the testator's death, they shall take the same share of his estate which they 
would have taken if he had died intestate, unless they have been provided for by 
the testator in his life time or unless it appears that the omission was intentional 
and not occasioned by accident or mistake .... " 
• G.L. c. 190, § 7 provides: 
An illegitimate child whose parents have intermarried and whose father has ac-
knowledged him as his child or has been adjudged his father under chapter two 
hundred and seventy-three shall be deemed legitimate and shall be entitled to take 
the name of his parents to the same extent as if born in lawful wedlock. 
1 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 2504, 356 N.E.2d 702. For additional discussion of Hanson, see 
Trusts & Estates § 3. 7 supra. 
• See text at note 2 supra. 
7 The plaintifrs allegation was not contested. Indeed, the father had acknowledged 
paternity in a Michigan support action in 1936. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2505, 356 N.E.2d 
at 702. 
1 /d., 356 N .E.2d at 703. The trial judge ruled that an illegitimate child is not the lawful 
heir of her father in these circumstances and granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment . 
• ld. 
11 ld. at 2506, 356 N.E.2d at 703. See U.S. CoNST., amend. XIV. 
11 Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred 
the case in its own motion. 1976 MaBS. Adv. Sh. at 2505, 356 N.E.2d at 703. 
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equal protection challenge for two reasons. First, the Court relied on an 
earlier Massachusetts case, Boston Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Fleming, 12 
for the principle that United States Supreme Court opinions on illegiti-
macy "have no application to the interpretation of a will and the legal 
effect of words used."13 The Court, moreover, found "nothing invidious 
in a legislative judgment that omission of a legitimate child from a will 
is an indication of possible mistake but that omission of an illegitimate 
child is not."14 On the contrary, the Court characterized the omitted 
child statutes as "merely [providing] a framework within which private 
testamentary decisions may be freely made."1G 
The second justification the Court offered for upholding the chal-
lenged classification was that even including illegitimates within the 
omitted child statute•• would not benefit the plaintiff, since section 5 of 
chapter 190 provides that "an illegitimate child inherits from her 
mother but not from her father." 17 
Five months after Hanson, the United States Supreme Court an-
nounced Trimble v. Gordon, 18 a case which casts considerable doubt on 
the constitutional viability of Hanson. In Trimble, the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute•• that essentially provided 
that illegitimates were heirs only of the mother for purposes of that 
state's intestacy laws.20 
A state court found decedent Sherman Gordon to be the father ofDela 
Mona Trimble in 1973.21 The decedent supported the illegitimate and 
openly acknowledged her as his child.22 However, the decedent died 
intestate and the illegitimate child was excluded as an heir on the force 
of the Illinois statute. 23 The illegitimate's equal protection challenge was 
unsuccessful in the Illinois state courts.24 
12 361 Mass. 172, 279 N.E.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 813 (1972). 
13 Id. at 179 n.7, 279 N.E.2d at 346 n.7. 
•• Hanson, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2507, 356 N.E.2d at 703. 
II fd. 
" G.L. c. 191, § 20 provides that the child would take the same share of the decedent's 
estate which she would have taken if the decedent had died intestate. For the text of § 
20, see note 3 supra. 
17 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 2507, 356 N.E.2d at 703. 
18 430 u.s. 762 (1977). 
" ILL. REv. STAT. c. 3, § 12 (1961) (current version at Iu.. REv. STAT. c. 3, § 2-2 (1977 
Supp.)). 
21 430 U.S. at 766. 
21 Id. at 764. 
zz ld. 
zz Id. 
z• Id. at 764-65. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision against DeJa Mona 
Trimble on the authority of its opinion in In re Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975). 
In Karas, the statute challenged in Trimble was upheld against similar constitutional 
attacks. Karas, 61 lll. 2d at 56, 329 N.E.2d at 242. 
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The mode of analysis adopted by the Illinois courts to uphold the 
statute was surprisingly similar to the method employed by the Su-
preme Judicial Court to uphold section 20 of chapter 191 of the General 
Laws.21 In both cases; the state courts relied on Labine v. Vincent28 for 
the proposition that a state's interest in encouraging family relation-
ships and in establishing an accurate and efficient method of disposing 
of property at death justifies a classification based upon illegitimacy.21 
However, the United States Supreme Court in Trimble criticized the 
Illinois court for failing to analyze the statute to determine whether it 
truly promoted the purpose suggested. 28 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
observed that decisions subsequent to Labine clearly reject the argu-
ment that a "State may attempt to influence the actions of men and 
women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate 
relationships,"28 thereby promoting "legitimate" family relationships. 
In its cursory treatment the Supreme Judicial Court in Hanson did not 
attempt to analyze the statute as being justified by either the state's 
interest in the familial relationship or any other interest. Instead, the 
Court merely cited Labine in support of its conclusion that the omitted 
child statute was constitutional.10 In the wake of Trimble, the validity 
of this approach seems problematic. 
The Illinois Supreme Court in In Re Karas31 also relied on Labine for 
a second justification of its illegitimacy classification scheme: the state 
interest in "establish[ing] a method of property disposition."32 The 
United States Supreme Court once again criticized the Illinois court for 
an incomplete analysis.33 Recognizing that a state has a valid interest 
in assuming the accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property 
at death, the Supreme Court nevertheless observed that "[f]or at least 
some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men, 
inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly 
settlement of estates .... ""The Court noted that when constitutional 
rights are at stake, the wording of the statute must be "carefully tuned 
• See text and notes 3-17 supra . 
• 401 u.s. 532 (1971). 
17 ld. at 538-39. See Hanson, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2507, 356 N.E.2d at 703-04; In re 
Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 52-53, 329 N.E.2d 234, 240-41 (1975). 
• 430 U.S. at 769 ("the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere incanta-
tion of a proper state purpose") . 
• ld. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2507, 356 N .E.2d at 703-04. 
II 61 lll. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975). 
n ld. at 48, 329 N.E.2d at 238. Analyzing the challenged statute with this justification 
in mind, the Illinois court focused on the difficulty of proving paternity and concomitant 
danger of spurious claims. 
n 430 U.S. at 770. 
14 ld. at 771. 
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to alternative considerations."30 Thus, "[d)ifficulties of proving patern-
ity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance 
of illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate."31 
In Hanson, the Supreme Judicial Court provided no analysis to sup-
port a legislative presumption that the omission of a legitimate child 
from a will is more likely to be the result of mistake than the omission 
of an illegitimate child.37 Even assuming the propriety of such a legisla-
tive presumption, the Court failed to consider the possibility of some 
middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion of the illegi-
timate and case-by-case determination of whether the omission is occa-
sioned by mistake or accident. It seems clear that if the Supreme Court 
in Trimble refused to accept the Illinois court's reasoning in Karas be-
cause the statute was not "tuned to alternative considerations, "38 the 
same result would obtain in Hanson. 3' In Hanson, the decedent was 
adjudged the father of the illegitimate in a Michigan court proceeding 
and was ordered to pay support for the child.40 If the decedent actually 
had intended to preclude his illegitimate child from taking under his 
will, he could have specifically indicated his intent in the instrument 
itself. Absent any such indication, it would seem that the inference is 
equally strong that decedent omitted his illegitimate child from his will 
by accident and mistake and not by intention. Therefore, the purpose 
of the Massachusetts omitted child statute is not satisfied, the reach of 
the statute extends beyond its asserted purpose, and the statute is con-
stitutionally flawed. 4' 
The second justification advanced by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Hanson to sustain the statute is equally suspect after Trimble. The 
Court in Hanson concluded that even if the omitted child statute were 
interpreted as including illegitimates, the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to relief because "its effect would be that she 'would take the same share 
11 Id. at 772, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 421 U.S. 495, 513 (1976). 
11 430 U.S. at 772. 
37 See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2507, 356 N.E.2d at 703. 
38 430 U.S. at 772. 
11 The Supreme Court in Trimble criticized the Illinois court for failing to consider 
adequately the relation between the Illinois statute, which made illegitimate& heirs of the 
mother and the mother's ancestors but not heirs of the father and the father's ancestors 
for purposes of intestate succession, and the state's proper purpose of assuring accuracy 
and efficiency in the disposition of property at death. Therefore the Court found the 
Illinois statute constitutonally flawed. See text at note 34 supra. The Court found that 
the statute extended well beyond its asserted purposes, because "(the] adjudication [of 
paternity] should be equally sufficient to establish [the illegitimate's] right to claim a 
child's share of [decedent's] estate, for the State;s interest in the accurate and efficient 
disposition of property at death would not be compromised in any way by allowing her 
claim in these circumstances." Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772 (footnote omitted) . 
.. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2505, 356 N.E.2d at 702. 
41 Compare note 39 supra. 
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of the decedent's estate which she 'would have taken if he had died 
intestate.' G.L. c. 191, § 20, as amended by St. 1969, c. 479, § 2. Under 
G .L. c. 190, § 5, an illegitimate child inherits from her mother but not 
from her father. "42 After Trimble, section 5 of chapter 190 is most likely 
unconstitutional. 44 
Certainly, one cannot fault the Supreme Judicial Court for failing to 
anticipate the Supreme Court's decision in Trimble. However, it seems 
clear that in light of past Supreme Court cases involving equal protec-
tion challenges to illegitimacy classification schemes, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court was remiss in failing to analyze closely the plaintiffs chal-
lenge to the omitted child statute. While past Supreme Court decisions 
are at best vague concerning whether illegitimacy is a "suspect" classifi-
cation requiring close judicial scrutiny,45 nevertheless, they are clear 
that any classification based on illegitimacy deserves more scrutiny 
than the Court normally affords state statutes of an economic or social 
regulatory nature.48 It is fair to say that the Supreme Judicial Court 
ened in deferring completely to the legislature in Hanson by applying 
a method of analysis clearly inconsistent with the equal protection con-
siderations generally afforded illegitimates aggrieved by a legislative 
classification scheme which discriminates on the basis of illegitimacy. 
§ 10.7. Sunday Closing Laws: Equal Protection. Sunday closing 
or "Blue"• laws may be traced to the colonial period of American his-
tory.2 Generally, these laws attempt to prohibit various types of com-
mercial activity on the first day of every week. Almostfrom their incep-
tion, numerous attempts have been made to challenge these laws on 
constitutional grounds.3 However, it has been only recently that a grow-
ing number of state courts have sustained such challenges, invalidating 
Sunday closing laws on constitutional grounds. 4 During the Survey year, 
41 /d. at 2507, 356 N.E.2d at 703 (emphasis added) . 
.. G.L. c. 190, § 5 provides in pertinent part: "An illegitimate child shall be heir of his 
mother and any maternal Ancestor .... " 
" The Illinois statute declared unconstitutional in Trimble, ILL. REv. STAT. c. 3 § 12 
(current version at ILL. REv. STAT. c. 3, § 2-2 (1977 Supp.)), provides in pertinent part: 
"An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal ancestor .... " 
41 Trimble, 430 U.S. at 777-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
•• Id. at 781. 
§ 10.7. 1 This term may have originated in the late eighteenth century in New Haven, 
Connecticut, when that city's Sunday laws were printed on blue paper. See Note, Sunday 
Closing Laws in the United States: An Unconstitutional Anachronism, 11 SuFFOLK U.L. 
REv. 1089, 1089 n.l. 
1 See generally A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 493 
(rev. ed. 1975). 
1 See, e.g., Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885) (a state may prohibit Sunday 
labor). 
• See, e.g., People v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y. 2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d 661 
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the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with an opportunity to rule 
on the constitutionality of the commonwealth's Sunday closing laws5 in 
Zayre Corp. v. Attorney General. 8 
Zayre is a Delaware corporation which operates thirty-four retail dis-
count department stores in Massachusetts.7 On Sunday, November 28, 
1976, Zayre opened its store in Springfield, Massachusetts for business, 
and a criminal complaint was filed in the district court against Zayre 
for violation of the Sunday closing statute.8 Zayre subsequently filed a 
complaint in the county court seeking "declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the enforcement of G .L. c. 136, § § 5, 6, and the pending criminal 
prosecutions. "1 
Before the Supreme Judicial Court, Zayre advanced two arguments. 
First, Zayre maintained that the scheme of statutory exemptions is 
arbitrary and not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 10 Sec-
ond, Zayre urged the Court to find that because certain types of stores 
are able to operate on Sundays due either to statutory exemptions11 or 
patterns of local enforcement, the statute operates in an arbitrary or 
irrational manner ,12 
(1976); Rutledge v. Gaylord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Spartan's Indus., 
Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972). But cf. Woonsocket Prescription Center, 
Inc. v. Michaelson, 417 F. Supp. 1250, 1259 (D.R.I. 1976) (blanket retail exemption based 
on small size a reasonable classification scheme). 
• G.L. c. 136, §§ 5, 6. 
Section 5 provides: 
Whoever on Sunday keeps open his shop, warehouse, factory or other place of 
business, or sells foodstuffs, goods, wares, merchandise or real estate, or does any 
manner of labor, business or work, except works of necessity and charity, shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than twenty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars 
for a first offense, and a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred 
dollars for each subsequent offense, and each unlawful act or sale shall constitute 
a separate offense. 
Section 6 lists 49 types of activity exempted from the coverage of § 5. 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 819, 362 N.E.2d 878. 
7 /d. at 822, 362 N.E.2d at 880. 
• ld. at 821, 362 N.E.2d at 880. 
1 /d. 
On December 10, 1976, the matter was presented to a single justice of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, who refused to grant the injunction but indicated that the Sunday closing 
law was prima facie unconstitutional. See Boston Globe, Dec. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 5. On 
December 24, 1976, the single justice certified a ciass represented by Zayre Corp. and 
consisting of "retailers who wish to open for business on Sundays." The members of the 
class included, among others, various department stores, discount, hardware and home 
supply stores. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 821-22, 362 N.E.2d at 880-81. 
•• Id. at 823, 362 N.E.2d at 881. 
11 See G.L. c. 136, § 6. 
12 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 823, 362 N.E.2d at 881. 
It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs conceded the state's power to enact Sunday 
closing legislation. Therefore, the plaintiffs rested their constitutional challenge solely on 
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By focusing exclusively on the equal protection claims, the plaintiffs 
allowed the Court to apply a rational relationship test to the challenged 
statute. 13 Applying this traditional equal protection analysis, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "a lack of any 
conceivable basis" for the statutory provisions and therefore had not 
overcome the presumption of constitutional validity .14 
The Court further indicated that the pattern of statutory exemptions 
to the Sunday closing laws did not invalidate the statutory scheme.•• 
The Court granted that, taken as a totality, the exemptions seemed less 
than cogent, but observed that "(s]o long as the particular exemptions 
have a rational basis consistent with the statutory purposes they will 
pass constitutional muster."" The Court thereupon concluded that, 
while the statute was hardly "a model of clarity and precision,"17 it was 
not unconstitutional. 
In Zayre, the Court devoted a substantial part of its opinion18 to the 
task of distinguishing a recent opinion of the Court of Appeals of New 
York, People v. Abrahams," which held a similar New York statute 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 
The statute in Abrahams was in many ways similar to the Massachu-
setts statute.20 Its origins were of a religious nature, it had undergone a 
series of revisions since its inception and each revision had resulted in 
an expansion of exceptions to the general prohibition of public selling.21 
The plaintiff in Abrahams, an employee in a New York pharmacy who 
was charged with breaking the Sabbath for selling an item not specifi-
cally exempted in the statute, challenged the statute as violative of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution.22 
The plaintiff in Abrahams argued that the many exceptions to the 
New York statute had eliminated any rational nexus between the stat-
equal protection grounds, and raised no due process challenge. ld. at 824, 362 N.E.2d at 
882. 
11 ld. at 829-30, 362 N.E.2d at 884. 
14 Id. at 836, 362 N.E.2d at 886; see Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 
539, 541, 320 N.E.2d 911, 913 (1974). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 837, 362 N.E.2d at 887. 
11 Id.; see, e.g., Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 344 Mass. 
695, 700, 184 N .E.2d 344, 348 (1962) ("H a rational basis may be discerned for distinguish-
ing between businesses which in many respects are similar, Sunday closing laws which 
exempt some such businesses are not unconstiutional because of the exemptions"). 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 844, 362 N.E.2d at 890 (footnote omitted). 
18 Id. at 833-35, 362 N.E.2d at 895-86. 
II 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1976). 
• See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 9 (McKinney 1968 & 1977 Supp.). 
21 40 N.Y.2d at 280, 353 N.E.2d at 575, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (a "gallimaufry of excep-
tions"). 
22 Id. 
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ute and its purpose of providing a day of rest and relaxation. 23 While 
recognizing that there may be arbitrary distinctions as part of a rational 
legislative pattern, the New York Court of Appeals nevertheless held 
that "where a statute encompasses a haphazard and anachronistic 
amalgamation of exceptions lacking discernible connection to the law's 
purpose, it cannot be judicially condoned."24 
The New York Court of Appeals in Abrahams thus applied the same 
equal protection analysis utilized by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Zayre, but arrived at the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Judicial 
Court attempted to explain this anomaly on traditional jurisprudential 
grounds.23 However, it seems more likely that the real explanation for 
the differing results in Abrahams and Zayre lies more in the practical 
recognition by the New York court that the Sunday closing law had 
become a hodgepodge of exceptions and no longer accomplished any 
religious or business purpose.28 
Noble though the day of rest may be, neither state's "Blue" law as 
written could accomplish this result and neither state's legislature had 
taken the initiative to correct the situation. Societal and business inter-
ests have changed since the early days of the Sunday closing laws and 
legislatures in attempting to respond piecemeal to these changes created 
in both New York and Massachusetts statutes which are utterly lacking 
in cohesive scheme and which are thus irrational for constitutional pur-
poses. The New York Court of Appeals in Abrahams was willing to take 
a bold step and to recognize that a gradual erosion of the societal basis 
for an ancient statutory scheme has rendered that scheme unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Judicial Court was not willing to take such a step.27 
D fd. 
u ld. at 285, 353 N.E.2d at 578, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 665. 
211 According to the Court, 
[S]ince each State court must examine a challenged statute in light of its own 
constitutional requirements (as well, perhaps under the Federal constitutional re-
quirements) on the particular record placed before it, we considered Abrahams to 
be illuminating but not controlling. It seems clear to us that the substantial differ-
ences in history, experience and statutory structures, as well as the record before a 
court, make each decision one which is the peculiar responsibility of the State court 
before which such an issue is raised. 
1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 835, 312 N.E.2d at 886. 
11 See text at notes 19-24 supra. 
11 In November, 1977 the legislature passed Acts of 1977, c. 722, which provides: 
Section 6 of chapter 136 of the General Laws, as most recently amended by 
chapter 697 of the acts of 1975, is hereby further amended by adding the following 
clause:-
(50) · The keeping open of a store or shop and the sale at retail of goods therein, 
but not including the retail sale of goods subject to chapter one hundred and thirty-
eight, and the performance of labor, business, and work connected therewith on 
those Sundays following the fourth Thursday in November and preceding Christ-
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mas. Work performed under this clause shall be compensated at a rate not less than 
one and one-half times the employee's regular rate, provided that no employee shall 
be required to perform such work. Any violation of the provisions of this clause shall 
be deemed an unfair labor practice under the provisions of chapter one hundred 
and forty-nine. 
Unfortunately, instead of revising the Sunday closing laws to reflect modern concerns, the 
addition is but another amendment to an already overburdened statutory scheme. See 
G.L. c. 136 § 6(1)-(49). 
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